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Anyone can try a case. That is as easy as falling off a log. The
difficulty comes in knowing what to do with a man once he has
been found guilty.
-Justice McCardle'
I. THE PROBLEM GENERALLY: THE NEED FOR SENTENCE REVIEW
Perhaps in no other area of the law is a trial court's power greater
than when it is given the task of criminal sentencing. Historically
and traditionally, the trial court judge has been given the widest lat-
itude of discretion in determining a proper sentence once a criminal
defendant has been found guilty.' Indeed, the task of sentencing has
been deemed a matter of discretion rather than a question of law.'
As a result, trial judges historically have not articulated reasons for
the sentences that they impose. However, with very few standards or
criteria to measure the appropriateness of their decisions, trial
judges have been left to rely on little more than their individual bi-
ases and private notions of justice.
When one examines the number of possible factors to consider in
setting punishment, the wide discretion of the trial court can be-
come problematic. Consider the hypothetical case of a child molester
who lures a ten-year-old girl into the woods, forces her to perform
sexual acts on him, but does not threaten or physically beat her.
The defendant has one prior conviction for unlawful sexual contact
of a minor and a history of psychological problems. He is convicted
of gross sexual assault, which carries a maximum sentence of forty
years, as mandated by the Legislature. What is the appropriate
length of punishment for the child molester? Any of the following
factors might be considered important: the nature and seriousness of
1. Simon E. Sobeloff, The Sentence of the Court: Should There Be Appellate
Review?, 41 A.B.A. J. 13 (1955) (quoting Justice McCardle, an English judge).
2. Simon E. Sobeloff, former Solicitor General of the United States and Chief
Judge of the Fourth Circuit, has pointed out the irony of our criminal justice system,
where the defendant is afforded a variety of protections at every stage of the
trial-the right to be represented by counsel, the exclusion of hearsay, the right of
the accused to be confronted with witnesses against him, and the right not to take the
stand without comment by the prosecutor-yet no such protections exist when the
defendant goes before the sentencing judge to be sentenced. Judge Sobeloff com-
mented, "It has been very impressive to me that the law is so solicitous of the defend-
ant in safeguarding his rights at every stage of the trial before verdict and yet leaves
him almost completely without protection when he stands before the judge to be sen-
tenced." Id. at 13.
3. Daniel E. Wathen, Disparity and the Need for Sentencing Guidelines in
Maine: A Proposal for Enhanced Appellate Review, 40 ME. L. REV. 1, 5 n.10 (1988)
[hereinafter Disparity]. However, as Justice Wathen points out, the fact that sen-
tencing may require a discretionary judgment does not mean that it should escape
review altogether, since in other areas of the law discretionary judgments are subject
to a deferential standard of review (i.e., abuse of discretion). Id. See also MARVIN E
FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES-LAW WITHOUT ORDER 83-84 (1972).
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his conduct; his prior criminal conviction; his history of psychologi-
cal problems; and the impact of the assault on the ten-year-old vic-
tim. For example, because of the seriousness of the offense, the im-
pact on the victim, and defendant's prior history of child
molestation, the need to protect the public by isolating him from
society might suggest that a substantial period of incarceration is
appropriate. Yet, in light of the defendant's psychological problems,
the absence of extreme violence in his acts, and the absence of an
extensive criminal record, rehabilitation might be ineffective unless
a lesser period of incarceration is imposed.
Thus, in order to determine the appropriate length of punish-
ment, the sentencing judge must decide which sentencing goal is pri-
mary, as well as the relative weight of the secondary goals. However,
while Judge A might consider victim impact to be relatively unim-
portant in this case, Judge B might consider it the primary factor in
setting punishment. Likewise, Judge C could believe that the nature
of the conduct is particularly egregious in this case; by contrast,
Judge D might consider the fact that the defendant did not physi-
cally harm the child to be a mitigating circumstance requiring a less
severe sentence than that imposed by Judge C. All four judges may
differ on what role the defendant's prior criminal conviction should
play in determining his sentence-and so on.
The above hypothetical illustrates the basic, philosophical prob-
lem of sentencing: What factors should be considered in determining
a sentence, and how should these factors interact to produce specific
sentences in particular cases? Furthermore, who should have the au-
thority to decide the answer to this question? As the hypothetical
shows, individual trial judges, each with their own sentencing philos-
ophies, would almost inevitably arrive at very different sentences for
the child molester. Yet because of the trial judge's virtually unlim-
ited discretion to determine the length of a sentence, each sentence
would also be upheld as proper as long as it fell within the broad
statutory limits set by the Legislature.
Such a system, vesting all sentencing discretion in the trial judge,
has been criticized as leading to gross, unexplainable disparities in
sentences.4 Although in reality only one trial judge sentences the of-
fender (or offenders) in any given case, disparity occurs in the sys-
tem when similar offenders committing similar offenses receive
widely disparate sentences from different judges. For example, un-
warranted disparity exists when two first offenders, each carrying a
gun, enter a bank, steal $10,000 from a teller, are arrested, con-
victed, and sentenced-one of them to two years in prison by one
judge, the other to ten years by another. It is this inter-judge dispar-
4. See, e.g., Sobeloff, supra note 1, at 13; Sobeloff, Appellate Review of
Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 273 (1962) [hereinafter Appellate Review of Sentencesl.
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ity in sentencing which works harm to the criminal justice system,
as members of society lose faith in the ability of the system to pro-
duce a just and rational result.
Hence, critics argue that there is a need to further structure and
govern the exercise of discretion by the sentencing judge through
the creation of sentencing guidelines. There are two primary mecha-
nisms for creating sentencing guidelines: legislative enactment, and
the development of a common law body of sentencing guidelines
through the appellate process. Although an in-depth comparison of
a system of legislatively-determined sentencing guidelines with that
of appellate review of sentences is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment, some basic points can be made.' Typically, under a legisla-
tively-created sentencing guideline system, a sentence is determined
by applying the offender's circumstances to a grid which takes into
account two variables: the nature of the offender's conduct, and the
background and character of the offender.' The range of sentence
length depends on where the sentence for that particular crime is
located on the grid, and the location of a sentence on the grid de-
pends in turn on a number of fact-specific criteria, such as the pres-
ence or absence of a weapon, the amount of drugs, if any, in posses-
sion, or a prior criminal record. Anticipating all the possible factual
situations which should be taken into consideration in determining a
proper sentence and putting them in the form of sentencing guide-
lines are monumental tasks.ill-suited to a legislative body.7 In addi-
tion, legislatively-created sentencing guidelines have been criticized
for being too rigid, mechanical, and inflexible;8 for removing the sen-
tencing judge's discretion and replacing it with even more
prosecutorial discretion;9 for causing heavy backlogs and delay; and
5. For a discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines model, a system of legislatively-determined guidelines, see, e.g., Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1988); Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discre-
tion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883
(1990); Stephen G. Breyer and Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines: A Dialogue, 26 CraM. L. BULL. 5 (1990).
6. An example of a system of sentencing guidelines created through the legislative
and administrative process is the federal model adopted in 1987. See Sentencing
Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,046 (May 13, 1987). For a more
thorough explanation of how the Federal Sentencing Guidelines operate, see also in-
fra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
7. Disparity, supra note 3, at 3.
8. See, e.g., id.
9. See, e.g., Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to
Disparity, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 142, 143 (1991); William W. Schwarzer, Judicial
Discretion in Sentencing, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 339, 340 (1991); Frank S. Gilbert,
A Probation Officer's Perception of the Allocation of Discretion, 4 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 109, 109-10 (1991). Under the Federal Sentencing Guideline model, if the Guide-
lines are rigorously applied there is little opportunity to plea bargain because the
defendant will be able to calculate his punishment well before sentencing and thus
[Vol. 44:345
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for needing constant refinement and oversight by an administrative
body.10
By contrast, a system which creates sentencing guidelines through
appellate review utilizes an existing system-the judiciary-to de-
velop a body of common law principles which evolves step by step
through the process of deciding actual cases. Appellate review of
criminal sentences can contribute significantly to the fair imposition
of sentences by providing a second look at the sentence-in effect, a
check upon the exercise of trial court discretion. By examining the
propriety of the sentence and correcting improper sentences, appel-
late review can provide a remedy for the problem of sentencing dis-
parity. Perhaps more importantly, a system of appellate sentence re-
view has the potential to create a body of rational and just
sentencing criteria through case law which, through continued appli-
.cation, leads to more fair and consistent sentencing practices by trial
judges.
Thus, appellate review of sentences may be seen as a compromise,
striking an appropriate balance between the rigidity of statutory
guidelines and the inevitable inconsistency of individual sentencing
judges exercising unqualified discretion. As Judge Sobeloff, former
Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit, commented: "Equally to be
avoided are two extremes: on the one hand the undeviating rigidity
of statutes and on the other unappealable and sometimes capricious
and inflamed sentencing by a single [person] on the bench.""
Maine, like many other states, 2 has chosen the judiciary as the
body to structure the exercise of trial court discretion in sentencing
matters. In 1965, the Legislature enacted a procedure of limited ap-
will have little incentive to enter a guilty plea (and every incentive to insist on going
to trial). This situation has prompted prosecutors to "bend the rules a little bit" by
engaging in fact bargaining (i.e., stipulating to certain facts-such as a smaller quan-
tity of drugs in possession than was actually found-in return for cooperation) and
charge bargaining (i.e., dropping certain charges in striking a deal). Id. These prac-
tices have been criticized as producing more sentencing disparity, which was exactly
what the Federal Sentencing Guideline system was intended to prevent. Id.
10. See, e.g., Disparity, supra note 3, at 3.
11. Sobeloff, supra note 1, at 17.
12. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120 (1990); ALASKA R APP P 215(a)(1); A=IL Ra"
STAT. ANN. § 13-4033 (1989); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1237 (West 1981); COLo REV STAT §
18-1-409(1) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-195 (West 1985); GA CODE ANN § 17-
10-6(A) (Michie 1990); HAW REV STAT. § 641-11 (1985); IDAHo CODE § 1-204 (1990);
IDAHO APP. R, 11(c)(6); ILL. ANN STAT ch. 38, para. 1005-5-4.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1991); IND. R. App. REV. SENTENCES 1; IOWA CODE ANN § 814.6(0)(a) (West 1979): MD
ANN. CODE of 1957 Art. 27, § 645JA (1992); MASS GEN LAWS ANN, ch. 278, § 28A,
28B (West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN § 244.11 (West Supp. 1992); MohTr CODE ANN §
46-18-903 (1990); NEB. REV. STAT § 29-2308 (1989); NH REV STAT ANN § 651:58
(1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-7 (West 1982); N Y CRim PROC LAW § 4.50.10(2) (Mc-
Kinney 1983 & Supp. 1992); NC GEN. STAT § 15A-1444 (1988); TENN CODE ANN §
40-35-402 (1990); Wis. STAT. ANN § 974.02 (West 1985) construed an Nelson v. State,
151 N.W.2d 694, 705-06 (Wis. 1967).
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pellate review of sentences. Under that system, a three-judge panel
was restricted to correcting only the most extreme sentences on re-
view, and thus it largely failed to develop any useful precedent on
the law of sentencing. 13
Accordingly, sentencing in Maine remained a matter of nearly ab-
solute discretion and unreviewable power by the sentencing judge. 14
With the adoption of the Maine Criminal Code in 1976,11 parole and
indeterminate sentences were abolished, giving the sentencing judge
an even less reviewable degree of discretion in sentencing.' 0 After
abolition of parole and indeterminate sentences, virtually the only
limitation placed on the sentencing judge as to length of sentence
was a broad range of sentences set forth in the Maine Criminal Code
based on the severity of the offense."' In an attempt to further guide
the exercise of the sentencing judge's discretion, the Legislature also
enacted a list of general sentencing purposes in 1976. These pur-
poses include the following:
1. To prevent crime through the deterrent effect of sentences,
the rehabilitation of convicted persons, and the restraint of con-
victed persons when required in the interest of public safety;
2. To encourage restitution in all cases in which the victim can
be compensated and other purposes of sentencing can be appropri-
ately served;
3. To minimize correctional experiences which serve to promote
further criminality;
4. To give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may
be imposed on the conviction of a crime;
5. To eliminate inequalities in sentences that are unrelated to
legitimate criminological goals;
6. To encourage differentiation among offenders with a view to a
13. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
14. See Disparity, supra note 3, at 5. See also State v. Allison, 427 A.2d 471, 475
(Me. 1981) (Law Court's appellate role is limited to review of the sentence's legality).
15. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1-1357 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990-1991).
16. An indeterminate sentence leaves the length of imprisonment open to contin-
ual re-evaluation by an administrative body. Melvyn Zarr, Sentencing, 28 ME L REV
117, 117 (1976). In a determinate sentence, the sentencing judge has the power to fix
the term of imprisonment within a range; the judge's discretion is enhanced because
the sentence may no longer be changed or reviewed by the Parole Board or other
administrative agency. See also Disparity, supra note 3, at 7.
17. In 1976, the Maine Criminal Code established a classification system whereby
each crime carries a maximum term of imprisonment. Five classes of offenses were
created, from A to E. A Class A offense carried with it a maximum period of impris-
onment of twenty years (this maximum was increased to forty years in 1988 by P.L.
1987, ch. 808); Class B offenses are punishable by up to ten years imprisonment; a
Class C offense has a maximum period of imprisonment of five years; Class D crimes
may result in a maximum of one year imprisonment; and Class E offenses carry a
maximum six-month sentence. ME. REV. STAT. ANN tit. 17-A, § 1252(2) (West 1983).
In addition, for murder, the most serious offense, the authorized range of sentence is
from twenty-five years to life imprisonment. Id. § 1251.
[Vol. 44:345
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just individualization of sentences;
7. To promote the development of correctional programs which
elicit the cooperation of convicted persons; and
8. To permit sentences which do not diminish the gravity of of-
fenses, with reference to the factor, among others, of the age of the
victim. 8
However, these purposes of sentencing were also insufficient to
guide the discretion of the trial judge because, in determining a sen-
tence, the judge normally seeks to achieve more than one of the
multiple sentencing objectives above-yet many of these sentencing
purposes are in direct conflict with each other. For example, the aim
of rehabilitating the offender often conflicts with that of deterring
others; similarly, the goal of differentiation of offenders in order to
individualize sentences may be at odds with eliminating inequalities
in sentences. In addition, individual trial judges differ on the rela-
tive weight to give to each sentencing objective, and even on
whether the priorities should change from case to case. Finally,
there is even disagreement over whether a particular factor is a miti-
gating or aggravating circumstance.' Therefore, without more struc-
ture in the sentencing process, it was difficult under the 1976 enact-
ments for trial judges to reach consistent sentences for similar
offenses committed by similar offenders.
Thus, dissatisfaction with the system's ability to reduce unwar-
ranted sentencing disparity continued, notwithstanding the limited
appellate review system and the purposes of sentencing set forth in
the Criminal Code.2" In 1988, perhaps in response to this perceived
discontent, Chief Justice Daniel E. Wathen, then Associate Justice
of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, proposed to expand the ap-
pellate sentence review procedure to a discretionary review by the
full Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court.2 ' The propo-
sal urged creation of an affirmative duty on the Law Court to create
a common law body of sentencing guidelines. 22 The Legislature
adopted Justice Wathen's proposal in 1989; but less than two years
later the Legislature passed emergency legislation again reforming
18. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1151 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991-1992). In 1976,
the original language in the eighth factor read as follows: "To permit sentences which
do not diminish the gravity of offenses." ME. REV STAT ANN tit. 17-A, § 1151 (West
1983). The language was modified in 1983 to include "with reference to the factor,
among others, of the age of the victim." ME. REV. STAT ANN tit. 17-A. § 1151 (West
Supp. 1991-1992).
19. Disparity, supra note 3, at 7. Justice Wathen cited the example of whether
intoxication mitigates or aggravates the seriousness of an unrelated offense. Id., n.16.
20. In 1983, for example, the Legislature created the Maine Sentencing Guidelines
Commission, finding that "disparate sentences for similar crimes by similarly situated
defendants continue to occur and undermine the principles of the penal system." P.
& S.L. 1983, ch. 53, § 1.
21. Disparity, supra note 3, at 35.
22. Id. at 34.
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the appellate review statute.
The frequency of legislative activity in the relatively short history
of appellate review of criminal sentences illustrates the difficulty
Maine has experienced in determining the proper role of the appel-
late court in sentencing. The purpose of this Comment is to examine
the role of the appellate court in the sentencing process in Maine,
and specifically to evaluate the effectiveness of Maine's appellate
sentence review procedure in reducing disparity in sentences and in
developing a coherent, rational body of law on sentencing policy.
Part II of this Comment will present a brief history and overview
of appellate review of sentences in Maine prior to 1989, and will ex-
amine the changes in the appellate review system as prompted by
Justice Wathen's proposal.2 3 Part III will review the Law Court's de-
velopment of sentencing guidelines and will identify the problems
which arose under the enhanced appellate review system as illus-
trated by case law. Part IV will document the legislative response to
the aforementioned problems and its impact on the effectiveness of
the appellate review procedure. It will also analyze the procedure's
effectiveness under the recently amended appellate review statute as
compared to that of the previous statute. This Comment will con-
clude in Part V with some recommendations and a discussion of the
tensions and conflicts between the Legislature and the Law Court
which make the future success of appellate review of criminal
sentences in Maine uncertain. Finally, the Appendix to this Com-
ment will propose legislation to the Maine Criminal Code creating a
new Class AA classification of crimes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Pre-1988 Appellate Review of Sentences
In 1965 Maine deviated from the general rule that "the appellate
court has no control over a sentence which is within the limits al-
lowed by a statute"'2 4 and adopted a system of limited appellate re-
view of sentences.25 That year, the Legislature created the appellate
division, composed of three justices of the Maine Supreme Judicial
23. Id. at 34-40.
24. Guerra v. United States, 40 F.2d 338, 341 (8th Cir. 1930). See also Williams v.
New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (upholding trial court's broad discretion to determine
sentence).
25. P.L. 1965, ch. 419, § 1 (effective Dec. 1, 1965) (codified at ME. REV. STAT ANN
tit. 15, §§ 2141-2144 (West 1980)), repealed by P.L. 1989, ch. 218 (effective Sept. 30,
1989). For an in-depth discussion of appellate review of sentences under this statute
(from 1965 to 1988), see Disparity, supra note 3, at 8-19. See also Roy T. Pierce, The
Efficacy of Maine's Procedure for Discretionary Appellate Review of Legal but Exces-
sive Criminal Sentences by the Supreme Judicial Court (Mar. 1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author); David J. Halperin, Sentence Review in Maine:




Court as appointed by the chief justice, to review sentences to the
state prison of one year in length or more.26 Under this system of
sentence review, the appellate division could change a sentence
which had been legally imposed within statutory limits, but which
was "improper" for any number of reasons. 2" The appellate division
was authorized to review sentence appeals and substitute either a
reduced or increased sentence.2" Sentence appeals were a matter of
right for any eligible defendant, and the appellate division's decision
was deemed final.29 Decisions written by the three-justice panel were
neither published in the Maine Reporter nor in the Atlantic Re-
porter, but were available in slip opinion form."
The appellate division had three main purposes: first, to "detect
and correct cases of substantial disparity not explained by the need
to individualize the sentence";31 second, to permit correction of
sentences which, although legal in length, were caused by a "failure
to consider relevant factors or of a consideration of improper fac-
tors[;] ' '3 2 and finally, to provide trial judges with "guides for the for-
mulation of better sentences."3 Although appellate review under
the appellate division did result in the correction of the most egre-
gious cases of sentence disparity,3 ' it was unsuccessful in producing
workable sentencing criteria to guide the discretion of trial judges.
Statistics show that a very small percentage (less than ten percent)
of eligible defendants sought appellate review of their sentences,"
26. P.L. 1965, ch. 419 (codified at ME. REV STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2141 (West 1980))
(repealed 1989). The basic structure of Maine's system of appellate review was taken
from that adopted by Massachusetts in 1943 and Connecticut in 1957. See MASS Gs
LAws ANN. ch. 278, § 28A, 28B (West 1981). See also CO N. GEN STAT ANN § 51-194
(West 1985). For a discussion of Connecticut's system of appellate review of
sentences, see Comment, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Con-
necticut Case Study, 69 YALE L.J 1453 (1960) [hereinafter Connecticut Case Study].
27. For example, one such reason is that the sentence is excessive. "An illegal
sentence is one that exceeds the range of sentence authorized by statute. An excessive
sentence, on the other hand, falls within the range authorized by statute, but is dis.
proportionate to the offense." Disparity, supra note 3, at 7 n.18. Maine's Constitution
may be seen as authority for creating more structure in the sentencing process by
virtue of its requirement that "all penalties and punishments shall be proportioned to
the offence." ME. CONsT. art. I. § 9.
28. However, the appellate division could not increase the sentence under review
without giving the defendant an opportunity to be heard. P.L. 1965, ch. 419 (codified
at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2142 (West 1980)) (repealed 1989).
29. Id.
30. See Disparity, supra note 3, at 13.
31. Sentence Review in Maine, supra note 25, at 134. "IT~he goal is not simple
equality of sentences but consistent application of sentencing principles .... " Id. at
151.
32. Id. at 135.
33. Id.
34. See Disparity, supra note 3, at 14-15.
35. Id. at 13.
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and an even smaller percentage (less than five percent) of appeals
resulted in changed (increased or decreased) sentences.39 In the
more than twenty years following its enactment, the appellate divi-
sion pronounced sentencing guidelines in only one case involving a
life sentence for murder.37 Clearly, with so few opportunities to re-
view sentences, the appellate division was not meeting the goals it
had been established to achieve-the reduction of sentencing dis-
parity and the development of rational sentencing principles.
B. 1984-1987: The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Movement to Reduce Sentencing Disparity
Concern for sentencing fairness in Maine continued into the 1980s
due to the perceived problems of overcrowded prisons, the abolition
of parole, increased sentences, and the imposition of disparate
sentences for similar offenders.3 8 Maine's concern over sentencing
disparity was no doubt influenced by the movement to address the
same problem within the federal system. Accordingly, the 1988
changes in Maine's appellate sentence review procedure are perhaps
best understood against the background of some unprecedented fed-
eral sentencing reforms in the period between 1984 and 1987.
In 1984 Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act 9 in re-
sponse to the widespread perception that unwarranted disparities in
sentencing were undermining public faith in the criminal justice sys-
tem.40 Under the old federal system, critics complained that the
length of sentence depended more on the judge than on the offense
committed by the defendant, and that judges did not have to articu-
late reasons for imposing a sentence.41 The 1984 Act's primary ob-
36. Id. In its twenty-four years of operation, the appellate division changed only
twenty sentences. Daniel E. Wathen, Judges on Judging: Making Law the Old Fash-
ioned Way-One Case at a Time, 52 OHIO ST. L-J. 611 (1991) [hereinafter Judges on
Judging]. By contrast, the Massachusetts appellate division acted on more than 1,200
appeals and modified over 350 sentences in a thirteen-year period from 1943 to 1956.
Connecticut Case Study, supra note 26, at 1464 n.62.
37. In State v. Anderson, Nos. AD-78-37, AD-78-40 (Me. App. Div. June 30, 1980),
the panel reduced the sentences of two defendants from life imprisonment to a term
of forty years each. After reviewing the appeal, the appellate division set forth the
following sentencing guideline for life sentences: a life sentence is never justified un-
less the crime is accompanied by aggravating circumstances such as premeditation-in-
fact; multiple deaths; or cruelty. Id. slip op. at 7-8.
38. Disparity, supra note 3, at 2.
39. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-
239, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976, 1987-2040 (1984). See also 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3551-3599 (West
1985 & Supp. 1991) and 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 991-998 (West Supp. 1991).
40. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 3 FED
SENTENCING REP. 339 (1991).
41. See, e.g., Helen G. Corrothers, Rights in Conflict: Fairness Issues in the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 38, 44 (1990). In the legislative history
of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress issued the following complaint:
[Ejach judge is left to apply his own notions of the purposes of sentencing.
[Vol. 44:345
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jective was to reduce unwarranted sentencing disparity. In order to
achieve this goal, Congress set out to create a system "which would
ensure that sentences were consistent with certain parameters";
4
'
these parameters would take the form of sentencing guidelines. The
Act established the United States Sentencing Commission, whose
duties included writing sentencing guidelines for the purpose of pro-
viding "certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing,
[by] avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal
conduct . . . . ,4 The Commission was composed of seven voting
members, including three federal judges, who were appointed by the
President subject to Senate confirmation."'
In November 1987, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines became
law. 5 The Guidelines took the form of a grid which determined a
sentence based on the characteristics of the offense and the charac-
teristics of the offender. How a sentence is determined under the
Guidelines may be summarized in six basic steps.'8 First, the offense
with which the defendant is charged determines the "base offense
level.' 47 Second, the base offense level may be modified up or down
in light of several aggravating and/or mitigating factors concerning
As a result, every day Federal judges mete out an unjustifiably wide range
of sentences to offenders with similar histories, convicted of similar crimes,
committed under similar circumstances.. . . [Tlwo such offenders who are
sentenced to terms of imprisonment for similar offenses may receive widely
differing prison release dates ....
These disparities . . . can be traced directly to the unfettered discretion
the law confers on those judges . . . responsible for imposing and imple-
menting the sentence. This sweeping discretion flows from the lack of any
statutory guidance or review procedures to which courts. . . might look.
S. REP. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1983), reprinted in 1984 USC CAiN
3182, 3221.
42. Harvey M. Silets and Susan W. Brenner. Commentary on the Preliminary
Draft of the Sentencing Guidelines Issued by the United States Sentencing Com-
mission in September, 1986, 77 J. CIm. IL & CRIMINOLOGY 1069, 1073 (1986).
43. 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1991).
44. 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(a) (West Supp. 1991).
45. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N. GUIDELINES MANUAL (1988) (hereinafter
1988 GUIDELINES MANUAL]. The Commission sent its initial guidelines to Congress in
April 1987, and the Guidelines took effect on November 1, 1987. Id. at 1.1. The Com-
mission may submit guideline amendments each year to Congress between the begin-
ning of the regular session and May 1. These amendments take effect automatically
180 days after submission unless a law is enacted to the contrary. 28 U.S.C.A. §
994(p) (West Supp. 1991).
46. See Stephen G. Breyer and Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: A Dialogue, 26 CRIm. L BULL 5. 9-16 (1990).
47. See 1988 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 45. § IBl.l(b), at 1.13 (the "base
offense level" is a number first assigned to each offense which corresponds to the
crime's severity relative to that of other crimes). See also Stephen Breyer, The Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17
HOFSTRA L. REV 1, 6, 12 (1988); Breyer & Feinberg, supra note 46. at 9-10.
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specific offense characteristics. 8 Third, "adjustments" may be made
to the offense level for the offender's role in the offense, efforts to
obstruct justice, acceptance of responsibility, and the impact of the
crime on the victim.' 9 Fourth, "points" may be calculated on the
basis of the offender's prior criminal record to determine a criminal
history category. Fifth, the offense level and the criminal history
category are applied to a sentencing table5" containing rows of of-
fense levels and columns of criminal history categories to determine
a range of sentences, the top of which range cannot exceed the bot-
tom by more than twenty-five percent.2 And finally, the sentencing
court may impose any sentence within the Guideline range, and it
may depart from the range if it gives reasons for the departure.5 3 In
such cases, the imposed sentence is subject to appellate review for
"reasonableness." '54
As a result of these changes in the federal system, the issue of
sentencing disparity moved to the forefront of sentencing policy na-
tionwide. Yet the Federal Sentencing Guidelines model immediately
came under heavy criticism on several fronts,55 including complaints
that sentencing disparity-albeit a different kind-continued under
the Guidelines,56 and that draconian sentences were routinely im-
posed." The movement to reduce sentencing disparity at the federal
level and the early perception that the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines had failed to achieve this goal no doubt had an intellectual
impact on the direction of sentencing policy in Maine.
48. See, e.g., 1988 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 45, § 2B3.1(b)(1)-(5), at 2.21-
2.22 (listing "specific offense characteristics" for the crime of bank robbery). For ex-
ample, in a robbery case, levels may be added for the amount of money taken and for
the presence of a weapon. Id.
49. See id. §§ 3A1.1 - 3E1.1, at 3.1-3.22.
50. See id. § 4Al.1(a), at 4.1.
51. See id. at 5.2.
52. Congress established the maximum size of the sentencing range as that term
which "shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than the greater of 25
percent or 6 months, except that, if the minimum term of the range is 30 years or
more, the maximum may be life imprisonment." 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(b)(2) (West Supp.
1991).
53. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b) (West Supp. 1991) (stating that a court must pre-
sumptively impose a sentence within the Guideline range unless "the court finds that
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
the guidelines ....").
54. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(a) and (b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
55. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
56. Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Dispar-
ity, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 142 (1991).
57. Schwarzer, supra note 40, at 341.
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C. 1988: Justice Wathen's Proposal for Enhanced Appellate
Review of Sentences Becomes Law
By 1988 the need for some modification of Maine's system of ap-
pelate sentence review had become apparent. Influenced by the fed-
eral sentencing reform movement (i.e., the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines) and the inadequacies of the sentence review procedure
under the appellate division, Maine responded in its own way to the
movement to reduce unwarranted disparity in sentences. In that
year, Justice Wathen proposed an expansion of the appellate sen-
tence review mechanism in his law review article Disparity and the
Need for Sentencing Guidelines in Maine: A Proposal for En-
hanced Appellate Review.5s Justice Wathen's proposal, which pro-
vided for a discretionary appeal of sentences to the Supreme Judi-
cial Court, was enacted in large part by the Maine Legislature in
1989 as the Appellate Review Act. 9 The system was modeled after
the English appellate sentence review system"0 and the American
Bar Association (ABA) Standards for Criminal Justice."
A brief description of the appeals procedure under the 1989 stat-
ute is as follows: 62 a person convicted of a criminal offense and sen-
tenced to more than one year in prison may apply to the Law Court
for review of sentence by first making application with a screening
panel (the Sentence Review Panel), composed of three justices of
the Law Court.6 3 If any one of the three members of the panel votes
in favor of granting leave to appeal, the appeal is heard before the
58. Disparity, supra note 3.
59. P.L. 1989, ch. 218 (effective Sept. 30, 1989) (codified at ME REv STAT ANN
tit. 15, §§ 2151-2157 (West Supp. 1989)), anended by P.L. 1991, ch. 525, § 4 (effective
June 30, 1991) (codified at ME. REV STAT ANN tit. 15, §§ 2151-2157 (West Supp.
1991-1992)) [hereinafter 1989 Appellate Review Act). The intent of the bill which
introduced this statute in 1989, L.D. 44, was specifically to implement the changes in
sentence review proposed by Justice Wathen in his MAINE LAW REVIEW article. See
L.D. 44, Statement of Fact (114th Legis. 1989).
60. For a brief discussion of the English appellate review system, see Disparity,
supra note 3, at 19-34. See also D. A. Thomas, Appellate Review of Sentences and
the Development of Sentencing Policy: The English Experience, 20 AL. L REV 193
(1968).
61. American Bar Association, 4 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTrCE. Standards 20-
1.1 to -3.3 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986). See also American Bar Association Special
Committee on Minimum Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice,
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES (1968) (hereinafter APPEL-
LATE REVIEW STANDARDS].
62. For a more comprehensive description of the Appellate Review Act proposed
in 1988, see Disparity, supra note 3, at 34-40. See also Roy T. Pierce, The Efficacy of
Maine's Procedure for Discretionary Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Crimi-
nal Sentences by the Supreme Judicial Court, at 22-29 (Mar. 1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
63. MF_ REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2151-2152 (West Supp. 1991-1992). The proce-
dure for application for leave to appeal is set forth pursuant to § 2153 in ME R CFU!
P. 40, 40A, 40B, and 40C (adopted effective October 2, 1989).
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entire Law Court."' After briefing and oral argument, the Law Court
is authorized to change the sentence to any sentence that was open
to the sentencing court, as long as the substituted sentence is not
more severe than that originally imposed.6 5
The Appellate Review Act was designed to remedy several weak-
nesses in the appellate division system. First, the structure and com-
position of the appellate division was not conducive to making a
comprehensive law of sentencing. The three-justice panel changed in
composition every few years, preventing any single member from
gaining the experience needed to formulate rational sentencing prin-
ciples.6 6 Under the new statute, although the application for appeal
of sentence was first viewed by a screening panel, granted appeals
were heard before and decided by the full court, whose composition
changed much less frequently than that of the appellate division. In
addition, while the appellate division was perceived as limited in its
role of correcting the most grossly disparate sentences, under the
new system the full Law Court was charged specifically with creat-
ing a common law body of sentencing guidelines.6 7
Second, under the old system of appellate review the small num-
ber of cases reviewed by the appellate division made it difficult to
achieve sentencing consistency. Clearly, a higher volume of appeals
was necessary to create a comprehensive body of law on sentencing.
Although appeal to the appellate division was a matter of right
under the former system, the possibility that a sentence could be
increased had a chilling effect on the number of appeals brought.6 8
As Justice Wathen commented: "[Although] the risk of an increased
sentence reduces the number of frivolous appeals, . . . the chance of
a stiffer sanction deters meritorious appeals as well. The continued
64. P.L. 1989, ch. 218 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2152 (West Supp.
1991-1992)).
65. P.L. 1989, ch. 218 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2156 (West Supp.
1989)) (amended 1991).
66. Disparity, supra note 3, at 19.
67. Section 2154(4) of the Appellate Review Act states that one of the purposes of
sentence review by the Law Court is "[t]o promote the development and application
of criteria for sentencing which are both rational and just." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 2154(4) (West Supp. 1991-1992).
68. The power to increase sentences on appeal also presents some constitutional
due process concerns. See State v. Violette, 576 A.2d 1359 (Me. 1990); see also
Thomas C. Bradley, Note, State v. Violette: Harsher Resentencing Encounters a
Bolder Presumption of Vindictiveness, 43 ME. L. REV. 523 (1991). See also Gregory
P. Dunsky, The Constitutionality of Increasing Sentences on Appellate Review, 69
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 19 (1978) (examining whether increasing a defendant's
sentence on appeal violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment). The
power to increase sentences has also been criticized in England as unfair because only
those who seek appeal are singled out for the risk of an increased sentence, while
defendants who do not appeal are not subject to such risk. Sentence Review in
Maine, supra note 25, at 138.
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use of such a blunt procedural device is both unnecessary and un-
wise. . . . [T]here are less draconian means of screening out frivo-
lous appeals." 69
The new statute provided that the Law Court did not have the
power to increase sentences, but could substitute a sentence, if it
chose to do so, with a reduced term within the statutory range. The
Sentence Review Panel was a more precise tool to control any po-
tential flood of appeals to the court, since it determined which appli-
cants would be granted leave to appeal. Furthermore, the require-
ment that only sentences of greater than one year in length were
appealable reduced the number of frivolous appeals which came up
for review.
Finally, the lack of wide publication of opinions was a major de-
fect in the former system. The appellate division rarely issued full,
written opinions containing sentencing criteria, and the few opinions
which did exist were not readily available to the legal community.70
It was virtually impossible to create sentencing guidelines through
the appellate process without the means to preserve precedent and
follow its development. Under the Appellate Review Act, granted
sentence appeals followed the standard appellate procedure of brief-
ing and oral argument before the Law Court, and the production of
an appellate opinion that was published in both the Atlantic Re-
porter and the Maine Reporter, along with the other opinions of the
Law Court.
In addition to remedying the defects in the previous statute, the
purposes of enhanced appellate review of sentences were set forth
explicitly in the new statute:
§ 2154. Purposes of sentence review by Supreme Judicial
Court
The general objectives of sentence review by the Supreme Judicial
Court are:
1. Sentence correction. To correct a sentence which is exces-
sive in length, having regard to the nature of the offense, the char-
acter of the offender and the protection of the public interest;
2. Promote respect for law. To promote respect for law by
correcting abuses of the sentencing power and by increasing the
fairness of the sentencing process.
3. Rehabilitation. To facilitate the possible rehabilitation of
an offender by reducing manifest and unwarranted inequalities
among the sentences of comparable offenders; and
4. Sentencing criteria. To promote the development and ap-
plication of criteria for sentencing which are both rational and
just."
69. Disparity, supra note 3, at 35-36.
70. Id. at 19.




The four purposes of the new statute address overlapping, interre-
lated concerns. When considered as a group, they reveal the main
underlying objective of the Appellate Review Act: to develop a more
uniform but still flexible approach to sentencing whose application
would reduce disparities in sentence length, and thereby increase
the fairness of the criminal justice system. However, achieving this
goal does not require that all offenders committing similar offenses
receive exactly the same sentence. Appellate review does not seek
uniform sentences for all offenders; if that were the goal, the Legis-
lature could easily enact mandatory sentences for every offense.
"[W]hat is sought is not absolute uniformity but a uniformly fair
and equitable approach." 2
The first stated purpose of appellate review is to correct sentences
that are excessive in length. The very use of the words "sentence
correction" in the statute represents a departure from the tradi-
tional notion of the trial court's unreviewable discretion in sentenc-
ing. In choosing this statutory language, the Maine Legislature rec-
ognized that such sentencing power in the exclusive hands of the
trial judge can lead to the imposition of excessive sentences. The
danger of excessive sentences may be great when, for example, the
influence of the media has led to emotional demands for extreme
and severe punishment. 3 On appeal, there is less likely to be emo-
tional pressure or excessive publicity; thus, being removed from trial
may actually be an advantage in certain circumstances.
If the Law Court determines on appeal that the sentencing court
imposed an excessive sentence because it did not properly consider
any one of three primary sentencing factors-"the nature of the of-
fense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public
interest""-it can correct the sentence. One objection to this goal is
that sentencing is fundamentally a discretionary matter of judgment
involving an intuitive process not amenable to rational analysis.7"
Therefore, the argument goes, there is no such thing as a "correct"
sentence. In the opinion of one trial judge: "Our judgment . . . is
better than our reasons. And it is vain to attempt to explain the
exact proportions attributable to our interest in punishment, retri-
bution, reform, deterrence, even vengeance. '76 Sentence review di-
rectly challenges this notion; its premise is that, within fairly liberal
boundaries, there can and should be a correct and reproducible sen-
72. Appellate Review of Sentences, supra note 4, at 273.
73. Simon E. Sobeloff, A Recommendation for Appellate Review of Criminal
Sentences, 21 BROoK. L. REV. 2, 8 (1955).
74. P.L. 1989, ch. 218 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2154(1) (West
Supp. 1989)) (amended 1991).
75. APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 61, at 5.
76. Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65
HARV L. REV 1281, 1292 (1952).
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tence, if the criminal justice system is to be fair and equitable to all.
Another argument against the "correction" of sentences is that it
interferes with the executive pardoning power." But the rationale
behind clemency (or, specifically, the governor's commutation of
sentences) is to provide relief in those extraordinary cases where the
system of justice is deficient. As the ABA Special Committee on
Minimum Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice
stated, "Executive clemency is, and should remain, for the highly
exceptional case where the question is not one of excessiveness
based on the ordinary factors affecting sentence, but where interven-
tion of the executive is prompted by unusual public interests."1' It is
precisely the goal of appellate review of sentences to prevent such
deficiencies in the system of justice so that the pardoning power is
reserved for the most exceptional cases. Since sentencing is largely a
judicial function, the judiciary should have the internal means to
correct its own mistakes.
The second and third purposes of appellate sentence review-the
promotion of respect for law and rehabilitation of the offender-are
concerned with the fairness and equity of the sentencing process. As
mentioned above, with absolute discretion vested in the sentencing
judge, the length of sentence may depend more on the individual
judge's conscience and personal convictions about justice than on
any consistent sentencing criteria. This results in unwarranted dis-
parity in sentences for offenses committed by comparable offenders,
and lack of faith in the fair administration of justice. In addition,
since it is clear that prisoners compare their sentences with one an-
other, unexplained disparities in sentences are likely to foster hostile
attitudes and therefore hamper rehabilitation.7 9 Sentence review
promotes respect for law and facilitates the rehabilitation of the of-
fender by creating a sense of fairness and rough reproducibility in
the process of determining a sentence. Thus, at the community
77. See APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 61, § 1.2 at 22-23.
78. APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 61, § 1.2 at 23.
79. As James V. Bennett, former Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
commented:
[Sentencing disparity fails] to stimulate a respect for the law among the
very persons whom the law is supposed to teach that respect. The prisoner
who must serve his excessively long sentence with other prisoners who re-
ceive relatively mild sentences under the same circumstances cannot be ex-
pected to accept his situation with equanimity. And the more fortunate
prisoners do not attribute their luck to a sense of fairness and justice on the
part of the law but to its whimsies. The existence of such disparities is
among the major causes of prison riots, and it is one of the reasons why
prisons so often fail to bring about an improvement in the social attitudes
of its charges.
JAMES V. BENNETT, OF PRISONS AND JUSTICE, S. Doc. No. 70. 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 319
(1964), quoted in ROBERT 0. DAWSON. SENTENCING- THE DECISION As To T,1'E. LENGTH.
AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE 216 n.6 (1969).
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level, appellate review instills public confidence in the criminal jus-
tice system; at the individual level, it protects the criminal defend-
ant against the unchecked idiosyncrasies or prejudices of a particu-
lar judge, thereby facilitating the rehabilitative process.
The fourth purpose of sentence review, perhaps the most impor-
tant in the Act, is the development of rational and just sentencing
criteria. Sentencing guidelines created through court decisions which
explain the grounds for modifying sentence length help to guide the
future discretion of the sentencing judge. Thus, in any given case,
the Law Court must state which circumstances should be considered
aggravating as opposed to mitigating factors, and which of the crimi-
nological objectives of sentencing-deterrence, rehabilitation, pun-
ishment, etc.-should be determinative. This purpose does not oper-
ate independently of the other three objectives of the Act. For
example, the goals of rehabilitation and promotion of respect for law
cannot be achieved without the consistent application of sentencing
criteria, since a consistent sentencing approach reduces disparities
in sentences, which in turn promotes respect for the criminal justice
system and enhances the prisoner's response to the rehabilitative
process. Thus, the development of sentencing criteria becomes the
dominant overarching purpose of sentence review in that its success
is required in order for the other purposes to be achieved.80
Under the 1989 Appellate Review Act, the Law Court had the
power to order one of three dispositions on review of a sentence
appeal:
1. Substitution of Sentence or Remand. If the Supreme Judi-
cial Court determines that relief should be granted, it may:
A. Substitute for the sentence under review any other disposition
that was open to the sentencing court, provided however, that the
sentence substituted shall not be more severe than the sentence
appealed; or
B. Remand the case to the court that imposed the sentence for
any further proceedings that could have been conducted prior to
the imposition of the sentence under review and for resentencing
on the basis of such further proceedings, provided however, that
the sentence shall not be more severe than the sentence originally
imposed.
2. Affirmation of Sentence. If the Supreme Judicial Court de-
termines that relief should not be granted, it shall affirm the sen-
tence under review.8 1
Thus, under the Act, the Law Court had the necessary procedural
80. Roy T. Pierce, The Efficacy of Maine's Procedure for Discretionary Appellate
Review of Legal but Excessive Criminal Sentences by the Supreme Judicial Court, at
18-19 (Mar. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).




mechanisms at its disposal to reduce unwarranted disparities in
sentences, the most important of which was the power to directly
reduce sentences that were improperly imposed by the trial court.
This power not only ensured a speedy and efficient sentence appeal
mechanism (i.e., the Law Court could create sentencing principles
without having to remand every case to the sentencing court), it also
made it possible for any modification of sentence to be based on a
uniform scale of punishment for each offense as determined by the
Law Court, as opposed to the individual scales of punishment of dif-
ferent sentencing judges.
In determining whether to grant relief in a sentence appeal, the
Law Court was authorized to consider several sentencing factors.
First, the court could consider the propriety of the sentence (i.e., its
proportionality to the offense rather than its legality), having regard
to three major sentencing factors: the nature of the offense; the
character of the offender; and the protection of the public interest.2
The facts of the aforementioned hypothetical child molester case
can be used to illustrate what type of circumstances are generally
considered within these three sentencing categories. For example,
the circumstances of the sexual assault (i.e., duration, extent of force
or violence, absence of weapon) would all be considered under the
nature of offense category. The character of offender category would
include such circumstances as the defendant's prior sexual miscon-
duct conviction, his psychological history, his remorse (or lack
thereof), and his prospects for rehabilitation. Finally, under the pro-
tection of the public interest category, such factors as the need for
the defendant to be isolated from society, community condemna-
tion, general deterrence, the impact of the offense on the victim, and
deductions in sentence length due to good time may all be relevant
considerations. 3
Second, the Law Court could consider the manner in which the
sentence was imposed and the sufficiency and accuracy of the infor-
mation on which it was based. "' For instance, if the trial court's sen-
tencing record did not contain information about the child mo-
lester's history of psychological problems-a factor which could be
critical to determining whether the defendant is criminally responsi-
ble-the Law Court could remand the case back to the trial court
for re-sentencing pending consideration of the omission.
82. P.L. 1989, ch. 218 (codified at ME REV STAT ANN tit. 15, § 2155(0) (West
Supp. 1989)) (amended 1991).
83. There may be some overlap in the factors considered under both the nature of
the offense category and the protection of the public interest category. This overlap
may explain why the Law Court did not separately consider the third sentencing fac-
tor-protection of the public interest-in its first eight sentence appeal decisions. See
infra part III.A.




With the new statute in place, the Law Court was equipped with
an express mandate from the Legislature to give direction and form
to sentencing law in Maine. "It is difficult to imagine a broader
charter or a more sweeping mandate for lawmaking" than that given
to the Law Court under the 1989 Appellate Review Act.8 5 Yet, only
eight sentence appeals and less than two years later, the Legislature
intervened with an emergency bill that removed some of the Law
Court's power to fulfill its mandated task. The following section con-
tains an analysis of the cases decided under the 1989 Appellate Re-
view Act, and the concomitant development of sentencing guide-
lines. Included in this section are three cases which became the
target of widespread criticism and led very rapidly to some modifi-
cations in the statute.8 6
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES
THROUGH CASE LAW
A. The Early Cases under the 1989 Appellate Review Act
The Law Court first exercised its new statutory duty to review
trial court sentences in State v. Hallowell. 7 In that case, the de-
fendant had been convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon88
and criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon. 9 The superior
court had sentenced the defendant to five years with all but four
years suspended, and four years probation for criminal threatening,
and a concurrent four-year term on the possession count.90 The de-
fendant appealed to the Law Court, claiming, in part, that his sen-
tence was excessive in length and failed to take into consideration
his prospects for rehabilitation.
In Hallowell the defendant, who had been drinking, got into an
argument over rent with the manager of a boarding house where he
had been living. As a result of the argument, he pulled a revolver
from his pocket and pointed it at the manager. When the manager
said to use the gun or put it away, the defendant cocked the ham-
mer and spun the cylinder showing live ammunition in the chamber.
He eventually left the manager alone, went outside and discharged
two bullets into a snowbank. After calling the manager and threat-
85. Judges on Judging, supra note 36, at 613.
86. These three cases are State v. Lewis, 590 A.2d 149 (Me. 1991); State v.
Michaud, 590 A.2d 538 (Me. 1991); and State v. Clark, 591 A.2d 462 (Me. 1991).
87. 577 A.2d 778 (Me. 1990).
88. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 393 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991-1992).
89. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 209 (West 1983). The maximum sentence for
both possession of a firearm by a felon and criminal threatening with a dangerous
weapon is five years.
90. State v. Hallowell, 577 A.2d at 779. The superior court initially sentenced the
defendant to two four-year consecutive terms for the offenses. On its own motion, the
court resentenced the defendant to concurrent terms. See generally ME. REV. STAT
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1256 (West Supp. 1983).
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ening him twice more on the telephone, the defendant was appre-
hended by the police.91
The defendant's circumstances offered little hope for rehabilita-
tion. At the time of sentencing, he was a thirty-seven-year-old un-
employed carpenter and high school drop-out. He had substantial
problems with substance abuse, and had an extensive criminal rec-
ord, including felony convictions for arson, gross sexual misconduct,
and aggravated assault.92
In an opinion written by Justice Wathen, the full Law Court re-
viewed the propriety of a criminal sentence for the first time and set
forth its standard of review for sentence appeals under the new stat-
ute: the court would examine sentences for "misapplication of prin-
ciple."9 3 Here, the court recognized that its role under the new stat-
ute was not to replace the trial court as the main sentencing
authority, but only to correct mistakes in principle. "It is not
enough that the members of this court might have passed a different
sentence, rather it is only when a sentence appears to err in princi-
ple that we will alter it."'9 The court seemed to indicate that, not-
withstanding the new appellate review statute, the discretion of the
sentencing judge would be largely preserved.
A closer look at the "misapplication of principle" standard of re-
view, however, reveals that deference to the sentencing court is not
required in all cases. Since the Law Court was charged with creating
a law of sentencing under the Appellate Review Act, its task was to
identify the proper sentencing principles to be applied in the first
instance. Thus, it would be premature for the Law Court to defer to
the lower courts until it had laid out the most basic sentencing prin-
ciples in its decisions. For example, if the Law Court found that a
sentencing court did not consider all the proper sentencing factors,
it could find an "error in principle" and remand the case to the
lower court for consideration of those other factors. Likewise, if the
sentencing court did not correctly apply those factors to the case in
question, the Law Court could directly substitute a lesser sentence
to reflect a "correct" application of principle without deferring to
the court below.
In applying the "misapplication of principle" standard in Hallo-
well, the Law Court concluded that the sentences were appropriate
and affirmed them. In doing so, the court pronounced its first sen-
tencing guideline under the 1989 Appellate Review Act, describing
how it had determined that the sentences in Hallowell were proper.
The court began with a consideration of the nature of the offense,
the first of three factors listed in the Act under the propriety of
91. State v. Hallowell, 577 A.2d at 780.
92. Id. at 780-81.
93. Id. at 781.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
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sentence. 5 "The maximum sentence in a given case should, in the
first instance, be determined by a consideration of the particular
nature and seriousness of the offense rather than by a consideration
of the circumstances of the offender."9 The court recognized that
varying degrees of seriousness could be present even within the
same generic offense and therefore recommended that all the differ-
ent ways in which the offense could be committed should be ranked
on a uniform scale.
The court then addressed the second sentencing factor in the
Act-the character of the offender.97 In rejecting the defendant's ar-
gument that the sentencing court failed to consider rehabilitation in
determining a sentence, the Law Court noted that "[tihe degree of
mitigation called for by the circumstances of the offender is, ill the
first instance, a matter for the sentencing judge. Any mitigating cir-
cumstances presented in this case are more than offset by aggravat-
ing circumstances." 8 When considering the Law Court's statement
that the maximum sentence is determined by the nature of the of-
fense only, a logical inference is that any aggravating circumstances
of the offender could never increase the length of a sentence. Thus,
the court's language in Hallowell suggests that if circumstances of
the offender exist which would be considered aggravating factors
(e.g., prior criminal record, no remorse), they could only prevent the
mitigation of a basic maximum sentence and could not serve to in-
crease the sentence.
Thus in Hallowell the court seemed to propose a two-step process
by which to determine a criminal sentence: first, the maximum sen-
tence should be determined by examining the nature of the offense;
second, after a maximum sentence was determined the court could
consider the circumstances of the offender, but only in terms of mit-
igation. In other words, factors such as the offender's age, mental
disposition, prospects for rehabilitation, and prior criminal record
could serve only to reduce a basic maximum sentence. It should
have come as no surprise that this approach to determining a sen-
tence was not only considered in Justice Wathen's 1988 law review
article, but was apparently modeled after English sentencing
guidelines. 9
95. See P.L. 1989, ch. 218 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2155(1) (West
Supp. 1989)) (amended 1991).
96. State v. Hallowell, 577 A.2d at 781 (emphasis added).
97. See P.L. 1989, ch. 218 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2155(1) (West
Supp. 1989)) (amended 1991).
98. State v. Hallowell, 577 A.2d at 781-82.
99. See Disparity, supra note 3, at 31. Justice Wathen noted:
Under the English view, although a sentencing judge is free to reduce a
sentence to reflect mitigating factors, "no penal objective ... justifies the
imposition of a sentence which is disproportionate to the facts of the case in
the sense that it exceeds the bracket or range appropriate to that variety of
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The soundness of such an approach to sentencing must be ques-
tioned at this point. It is unclear why the circumstances of the of-
fender (such as an offender's prior criminal record) should never op-
erate to increase a basic sentence determined by the nature of the
offense. In the study of penology, it is widely accepted that an of-
fender's prior criminal record is an aggravating factor, and that our
criminal justice system deals more harshly with recidivists than with
first-time offenders.100 That the Law Court, in its first chance to
pronounce rational sentencing principles, would propose an ap-
proach that considered the circumstances of the offender only in a
mitigating light is a bit baffling.10 '
It is possible that the Law Court did not intend to fashion such an
approach to sentencing; instead, the above language simply may
have been the result of imprecise drafting or oversight. That the
Law Court was neither perfectly clear nor comprehensive in its pro-
nunciation of its first sentencing principles is certainly understanda-
ble; after all, the court was attempting for the first time to establish
the proper relationship between the components of sentencing "on
the basis of little more than notions of justice, common sense, ra-
tionality, custom, and prevailing practice."10 2 Nevertheless, because
the court's articulation of sentencing principles in Hallowell was at
best unclear, it left room for interpretations which would result in
strong criticism of the new appellate review mechanism in the fu-
the offence concerned." Thus, the seriousness of the offense, rather than
aggravating factors that arise from the circumstances of the offender, gen-
erally controls the maximum sentence for the crime.
Given this flexibility for downward adjustment, the final step for the sen-
tencing judge is to identify any mitigating factors present and to determine
what reduction, if any, such factors merit ....
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
100. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). In addition, Maine has long
recognized the increased seriousness of a crime committed by a habitual offender. See
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362(3-A) (West Supp. 1991-1992). For example, in
State v. Bennett, 592 A.2d 161, 162 (Me. 1991), the Law Court (still using the Hallo-
uwell approach) explicitly recognized that recidivism was an aggravating factor in de-
termining a sentence. However, the court reasoned that in determining a sentence,
the persistent nature of the defendant's conduct (the fact that he had been convicted
twice of burglary five years prior to his present three-count conviction for theft) was
to be considered under the category of the nature of the offense, rather than the
character of the offender. Id. at 163. But see RICHARD G SINGER. JuST Da mirr SEN-
TENCING BASED ON EQuALrrY AND DESERT 67-74 (1979) (recidivists are no more culpa-
ble than first offenders under a "just deserts" theory because the harm imposed by
the offense and the injury inflicted upon the victim are the same in each instance).
101. Noticeably absent from the court's analysis was the third factor listed in the
Appellate Review Act-protection of the public interest. From the language in Hallo-
well, then, one might conclude that since the maximum sentence was determined by
the nature of the offense only, factors such as the public interest in removing danger-
ous individuals from society or the extent of victim impact also could serve only to
mitigate a sentence.
102. Judges on Judging, supra note 36, at 611.
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ture. But rather than refine or clarify the Hallowell language in sub-
sequent opinions, the Law Court followed its two-step approach in
several later cases without incident or adverse reaction.1
0 3
One such case was State v. Shortsleeves.104 In that case the de-
fendant, John Shortsleeves, was convicted of murder. 0 5 He and a
male companion, Tracy Meggison, killed a woman in her home.
Shortsleeves and Meggison had been drinking and, while driving
past the victim's home, Meggison indicated to the defendant that he
wanted to kill her. The defendant feigned a leg injury to get the
victim to let the co-defendants into her house. Once inside, Meg-
gison hit her repeatedly with his fist, then beat her with a billy club
and a frying pan provided by the defendant. They both kicked her.
In order to ensure that she was dead, Meggison then slit the wo-
man's throat and stabbed her several times with a steak knife which
the defendant had helped him find.'
Shortsleeves was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment0 7
and he appealed his sentence to the Law Court. In upholding the
sentence, the Law Court expressly adopted the guidelines for impos-
ing a life sentence that had been articulated in 1980 by the former
appellate division in State v. Anderson.0° The Law Court agreed
103. See, e.g., State v. Tellier, 580 A.2d 1333 (Me. 1990); State v. Shortsleeves,
580 A.2d 145 (Me. 1990); State v. St. Pierre, 584 A.2d 618 (Me. 1990); State v. Con-
stantine, 588 A.2d 294 (Me. 1991); State v. Michaud, 590 A.2d 538 (Me. 1991); State
v. Clark, 591 A.2d 462 (Me. 1991); State v. Bennett, 592 A.2d 161 (Me. 1991); and
State v. Rolerson, 593 A.2d 220 (Me. 1991).
104. 580 A.2d 145 (Me. 1990).
105. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 201(1)(A) (West 1983). The sentence for
murder is from 25 years to life. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1251 (West Supp.
1991-1992). A life sentence may not be reduced to a term of years; however, a sen-
tence for a term of years may be reduced by as much as one-third or more for good
behavior ("good time"). ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1253(3) (West Supp. 1991-
1992).
106. State v. Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d at 146.
107. Tracy Meggison was also later convicted of murder and sentenced to life im-
prisonment. Id.
108. The Anderson guidelines for life imprisonment are as follows:
[Tihe imposition of a life sentence has such a serious impact on the of-
fender so different from the impact of a sentence for a term of years that a
life sentence is never justified unless the murder is accompanied by aggra-
vating circumstances. Such aggravating circumstances include:
1. Premeditation-in-fact. By this we mean a planned, deliberate
killing including a killing for hire. By the use of the words "in-
fact," we mean to differentiate the premeditation to which we re-
fer from the legal fiction of premeditation recognized in some
states in which the premeditation exists for only an instant of
time before the actual killing. (Footnote omitted.)
2. Multiple deaths, including situations in which the offender in
committing the murder knowingly created a substantial risk of
death to several individuals.
3. Murder committed by a person who has previously been con-
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that a life sentence was not justified absent aggravating factors such
as those enumerated in Anderson; however, it also noted that the
sentencing court must consider whether the circumstances of the of-
fender required the reduction of a life term to a lesser sentence.'10
In this case, the Law Court held that the sentencing court did not
err in finding that the murder was accompanied by premeditation
and extreme cruelty and therefore justified a life sentence for the
defendant, even though he was an accomplice. ' Likewise, because
victed of homicide or any other crime involving the use of deadly
force against a person. We use the words "deadly force" as de-
fined by our Criminal Code in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 2(8).
4. Murder accompanied by torture, sexual abuse or other extreme
cruelty inflicted upon the victim.
5. Murder committed in a penal institution by an inmate of that
institution. This would include the murder of another inmate as
well as prison personnel.
6. Murder of a law enforcement officer while in the performance
of his duties.
7. Murder of a hostage.
It-is not our intention to suggest that life imprisonment must always be
imposed in cases of the types enumerated above. Such an approach was
abandoned by our legislature when it repealed the mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment for first-degree murder. Even in these circumstances
there may be mitigating factors which in the exercise of a sound judicial
discretion may cause a presiding Justice to impose a sentence for a term of
years rather than life imprisonment.
It is our intention to suggest that under the present formulation of our
Criminal Code life imprisonment is not justified in the absence of one of
these enumerated circumstances.
State v. Anderson, Nos. 78-37, 78-40, slip op. at 7-8 (Me. App. Div. June 30, 1980). In
Anderson the appellate division reduced two life sentences to 40 years each, finding
that a life sentence was not justified where the defendants shot the victim with a gun
during a planned robbery.
The Law Court's express adoption of the Anderson guidelines in Shortslee'es sug-
gests that the court may not have intended to consider the circumstances of the of-
fender only in a mitigating light. For example, the third aggravating circumstance
listed in the Anderson guidelines, "murder committed by a person who has previ-
ously been convicted of homicide or any other crime involving. . .deadly force," is
clearly a circumstance specific to the offender, not to the offense. Id. (emphasis
added). Under Anderson, then, certain aggravating circumstances of the offender
could increase a sentence from a term of years to life. Nevertheless, the Law Court's
language in Shortsleeves seemed to indicate otherwise. See infra note 109 and accom-
panying text.
109. The court in Shortsleeves stated:
Although the presence of these aggravating circumstances, premeditation
and extreme cruelty, permit the imposition of a life sentence, the court
must consider whether mitigating factors require a lesser sentence .. .
. . . [W]e conclude that the sentencing justice did not err in determining
that the circumstances of the defendant did not require any mitigation in
the sentence.
State v. Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d at 150 (emphasis added).
110. Shortsleeves illustrates the need for interplay between court and counsel in
developing sentencing policy through the appellate review scheme. Although charged
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of the defendant's extensive prior criminal record and unfavorable
psychological evaluation, the Law Court found that the sentencing
court did not err in concluding that Shortsleeves' circumstances did
not require mitigation of the life sentence imposed."1
Less than four months after Shortsleeves, the Law Court decided
State v. St. Pierre,"2 another appeal of a life sentence for murder.
For the first time the Law Court used its newly-expanded authority
to modify a sentence directly, reducing a life sentence to a term of
forty-five years. The defendant, Michael St. Pierre, met the victim,
a young, deaf mute woman, at a bar one evening. At the end of the
evening, after the defendant had allegedly consumed many drinks,
the victim voluntarily accompanied the defendant to his room,
where they became involved in a sexual encounter. According to de-
fendant's testimony, while engaging in oral sex the victim bit the
defendant's penis and punched him. 11 3 He reacted angrily and
struck her repeatedly with a broken jackhammer bit, attempted to
strangle her, and then dragged her body to the Kennebec River,
where he deposited her in the water." 4 The victim's body was dis-
covered floating in the river the next day.
In St. Pierre the Law Court once again followed the Anderson
guidelines: a life sentence for murder is permissible only if there are
aggravating circumstances of a specific type and only if there are no
mitigating factors that would require a lesser sentence. The Law
with creating sentencing guidelines, the Law Court, like any common law court, is
constrained by the arguments of counsel. The court cannot simply pronounce new
sentencing guidelines outside the context of a given case. In Shortsleeves defense
counsel never raised the argument that the sentencing criteria for murder accom-
plices should differ from the Anderson guidelines. Judges on Judging, supra note 36,
at 615. Instead, defense counsel argued that this case was similar to a previous case in
which the appellate division vacated a life sentence and distinguishable from those
cases in which premeditation and extreme cruelty had been found. Id.
Hence, the Shortsleeves court never had the opportunity to formulate new sentenc-
ing guidelines for murder accomplices. Whether the result in Shortsleeves was in-
tended or not, the case reminds us of the Law Court's limitation in articulating new
guidelines without the aid of counsel. Strong appellate advocacy is a fundamental and
critical element of a successful appellate sentence review mechanism. As Justice
Wathen has commented:
Although analogy is useful in making incremental steps in advancing or
retarding a developed doctrine, it is less useful when formulating the doc-
trine. Here a broader frame of reference is required. It is not enough that
the sentence is similar to another; rather the question is whether each sen-
tence is based on a formulation that is workable and produces desirable
results.
Judges on Judging, supra note 36, at 622.
111. State v. Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d at 151.
112. 584 A.2d 618 (Me. 1990). St. Pierre was decided on December 19, 1990.
Shortsleeves was decided on August 30, 1990.
113. Judges on Judging, supra note 36, at 617.
114. State v. St. Pierre, 584 A.2d at 619.
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Court first noted that the sentencing court could have found the de-
fendant's lack of a prior criminal record of violence and his good
prospects for rehabilitation to be mitigating circumstances requiring
a lesser sentence."1 5 However, the court instead rested its decision
on the fact that the sentencing court had erred in principle because
the defendant's conduct did not rise to the level of "extreme cru-
elty" as that term had been defined in Shortsleeves.110
In evaluating the nature and seriousness of the offense, the court
stated that a uniform scale within the statutory maximum must be
fixed for any given offense. The court said:
We are therefore commanded to arrange these heinous acts on a
continuum in order to determine which act justifies the imposition
of the most extreme punishment. Imposition of a life sentence on
the basis of extreme cruelty alone will require a showing that the
viciousness of the murder differed in a substantial degree from that
which inheres in the crime of murder. '1 7
The court went on to say that St. Pierre's acts, even though savage,
"did not involve torture or other gratuitous suffering inflicted on the
victim" and therefore did not deserve to be placed at the outermost
portion of the continuum which constituted extreme cruelty.' In
reducing the life sentence to forty-five years, the court relied in part
on supporting statistics which showed that the average sentence for
murder during the first eleven years under the Criminal Code was
thirty-four years."'
Thus, in St. Pierre the Law Court demonstrated its willingness to
be bold in formulating sentencing guidelines and to interpret its
scope of authority broadly under the new statute. In keeping with
the Hallowell two-step approach to sentencing, the court could have
decided to reduce the sentence based entirely upon the theory that
the defendant's circumstances demanded mitigation of the life sen-
tence imposed. Instead, it ventured into potentially more controver-
sial territory by concluding that the defendant's conduct "did not
evidence the extremely vicious quality that would constitute ex-
treme cruelty."'2 0 Arguably, a sentencing court could have found
that St. Pierre's conduct-repeated blows with a broken jackham-
mer bit, attempted strangulation, and throwing a body in a
river-constituted extreme cruelty; yet the Law Court still found a
"misapplication of principle" in that case. Under one view, the Law
115. Id. at 621.
116. Id. at 622. The Shortsleeves court defined the extreme cruelty circumstance
as "murder accompanied by torture, sexual abuse or other extreme cruelty inflicted
upon the victim." State v. Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d at 150.
117. State v. St. Pierre, 584 A.2d at 621.
118. Id. at 622.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 621.
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Court may have appeared to be abandoning its deference to the sen-
tencing court's discretion and substituting its own opinion of "ex-
treme cruelty." Under another view, however, it was merely fulfilling
its mandated responsibility to create a common law body of sentenc-
ing principles by functionally defining that term. It is interesting to
note that there was no widespread public reaction to the decision in
St. Pierre, and no legislative intervention at this point. However, as
this Comment will show, in State v. Lewis, State v. Michaud, and
State v. Clark (the Lewis cases), it was precisely this line of reason-
ing which prompted strong criticism and the resulting changes in
the Appellate Review Act.
In State v. Tellier12' the Law Court first considered the manner in
which the sentence was imposed in deciding to remand the case to
the sentencing court. One afternoon Joseph Tellier lured his neigh-
bor's ten-year-old daughter into his car under the pretext of getting
her advice in choosing flowers for his wife. He drove the girl to an
isolated spot, where he threatened to hurt her if she did not engage
in sexual acts with him. The defendant removed her clothes, had
sexual contact with her, and, when she would not agree not to tell
anyone what had happened, he choked her until she lost conscious-
ness, then left her.122
As a result of a plea bargain, the defendant eventually entered
guilty pleas to kidnapping, unlawful sexual contact, and aggravated
assault. He was sentenced to the maximum sentence of twenty years
for kidnapping, five years for unlawful sexual contact, and ten years,
with all but four years suspended and six years of probation, for
aggravated assault, to be served consecutively.123
Tellier appealed his sentence to the Law Court on two grounds.
First, he argued that consecutive sentences for kidnapping and sex-
ual contact were prohibited by statute12 since the offenses pro-
ceeded from the same criminal episode. The Law Court agreed and
held that the sentences should be concurrent, not consecutive. Sec-
ond, Tellier argued that his sentences were excessive in length. How-
ever, the Law Court held that it could not review the propriety of
the sentences because of the manner in which they were imposed.
Specifically, the sentencing court had considered only the nature
and seriousness of the offense in determining the sentences; it had
made no inquiry into the circumstances of the defendant. Therefore,
the Law Court found that the record contained insufficient informa-
tion and remanded for resentencing.126
The Law Court's decision in Tellier is significant for two reasons.
121. 580 A.2d 1333 (Me. 1990).
122. Id. at 1334.
123. Id.
124. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1256(2-3) (West 1983 & Supp. 1989).
125. State v. Tellier, 580 A.2d at 1336.
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First, the court emphasized the need for the sentencing court to ex-
plicitly articulate its reasons for imposing a given sentence in order
for appellate review to function properly. Second, in remanding Tel-
lier the Law Court demonstrated its willingness to require a sen-
tencing court's accountability and consideration of all relevant sen-
tencing factors. Ironically, the Law Court itself had not yet
determined what role the need to protect the public should play in
determining a sentence. In utilizing the Hallowell approach, it had
considered only two of the three sentencing factors listed in the stat-
ute: the nature of the offense, and the circumstances of the offender.
The third factor, the protection of the public interest, had not been
considered in any of the sentence appeals to the Law Court thus far.
However, assuming that the protection of the public interest encom-
passes the consideration of victim impact, this factor was clearly a
relevant concern in Tetier (i.e., the victim being a ten-year-old
girl).126 Nevertheless, the court did not explicitly acknowledge its va-
lidity in determining the sentence in Tetier.
It was not until State v. Constantine2 ' that the Law Court first
mentioned the protection of the public interest as a sentencing fac-
tor. In that case, the defendant was convicted of vehicular man-
slaughter and was sentenced to the ten-year maximum for that of-
fense. The defendant, who had been drinking at a dance one night,
took his parents' car without permission and drove it for approxi-
mately one mile on the wrong side of the road without the use of
headlights. He collided with a car operated by the victim, who died
on impact. The defendant was twenty-two years old at the time of
the offense, had been convicted of over a dozen other offenses, and
was a known abuser of alcohol and drugs. 28
He appealed his sentence to the Law Court on the grounds that
the sentencing court gave too little weight to his remorse and poten-
tial for rehabilitation, and too much weight to the goal of deter-
rence. The Law Court held that the sentencing court did not misap-
ply principle in weighing the sentencing factors, "in view of the
serious nature of Constantine's offense, Constantine's character as
demonstrated by his record and his prior probation violations, and
the protection of the public interest through deterrence of drunken
driving that risks inflicting death. 1 29 Thus, although the Law Court
identified the need to protect the public as a sentencing factor in
126. It was unclear whether the Law Court viewed factors such as the crime's
impact on the victim as affecting the nature and seriousness of the offense, or the
protection of the public interest. Nonetheless, the court's failure to squarely address
the issue of victim impact in Tellier became a central problem in the Leuts cases,
which led to reform of the Appellate Review Act. See infra notes 172-74 and accom-
panying text.
127. 588 A.2d 294 (Me. 1991).
128. Id. at 295.
129. Id. at 296.
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Constantine, it still did not state what relationship it had with the
other two sentencing components.
The uncertainty over the role of victim impact (one aspect of pro-
tecting the public interest) in sentencing decisions also continued in
Constantine. Unlike Tetier, though, the Law Court in Constantine
explicitly validated victim impact as a sentencing factor. According
to the court, the victim was an eighteen-year-old college freshman.
His father, a volunteer firefighter, coincidentally responded to the
scene of the accident and suffered severe emotional distress as a re-
sult. The victim's mother and younger brother were also strongly
affected, and there was community outrage about the incident. 130
Among the factors that the sentencing court had considered in sen-
tencing was the impact on the victim and the victim's family. In
upholding the sentencing court's decision, the Law Court agreed
that victim impact was a proper factor to consider: "[T]he factors
considered by the court are, in general, the ones that a sentencing
court should take into consideration. ' 131 However, while the Law
Court approved of victim impact as a valid factor in sentencing, it
again fell short of stating how this factor should be considered and
what relative weight it should be assigned in determining a sentence.
The court could have given significant guidance by defining the lim-
its of applicability of this factor. Instead, the court did not make
clear whether victim impact should be considered under the nature
of the offense category as a primary factor increasing the maximum
sentence, or only as a secondary factor under the protection of the
public interest category which, under the Hallowell approach, would
only offset any mitigating circumstances of the offender.1 32
In Constantine it is possible that the Law Court intended to show
deference to the sentencing court by not mandating just how the
protection of the public interest (and, specifically, victim impact)
should be weighed in determining a sentence. However, such sudden
"deference" to the sentencing court is unlikely, considering that the
sentencing approach set forth in Hallowell specifically outlined how
the factors of nature of offense and character of offender were to be
weighed in relation to one another.1 33 It is more likely that the Law
Court was trying to preserve its options for future cases as it had
not itself determined how the need to protect the public should in-
fluence sentencing policy. Unfortunately, as the next three cases will
130. Id. at 295.
131. Id. at 296.
132. See Supplemental Brief of Appellee on Sentence Appeal at 43 n.18, State v.
Gosselin, 600 A.2d 1108 (Me. 1991).
133. The fact that the Law Court was willing to enforce the Hallowell approach
by remanding Tellier because the sentencing court did not consider the character of
the offender is also inconsistent with the notion that the Law Court intended to defer
to the sentencing court on this matter.
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show, an early determination of the relationship among the three
components of a sentence is critical to a successful appellate sen-
tence review system. The uncertainty over these fundamental ques-
tions which remained after Constantine made it almost inevitable
that the Appellate Review Act would require modification.
B. The Problem Cases: State v. Lewis, State v. Michaud, and
State v. Clark
In April and May of 1991, the Law Court decided three sentence
appeals under the 1989 Appellate Review Act. In all three
cases-State v. Lewis,1's  State v. Michaud,"8  and State v.
Clark"'-the Law Court reduced the sentence by one-half or more
under its new authority to substitute lesser sentences directly on ap-
peal.1 37 This sharp reduction of sentence in three consecutive ap-
peals appeared to be a sudden departure from the court's previous
line of cases, in which only one out of five sentences had been re-
duced.'38 However, unlike the previous decisions, the Lewis cases
were decided after the enactment of a bill increasing the maximum
sentence for Class A crimes from twenty to forty years (Class A sen-
tence amendment).1 39 Thus, the sentence reductions in these three
cases were influenced more by the Law Court's interpretation of the
intent behind the Class A sentence amendment than by any other
factor. Nevertheless, the public reacted strongly to what it perceived
as an abuse of the Law Court's new sentencing power; as a result,
the Legislature passed an emergency bill limiting the Law Court's
future power in the sentence review scheme.
1. The 1988 Class A Sentence Amendment
At this point, it is important to outline the legislative history of
the Class A sentence amendment in order to better understand the
problems which arose in the Lewis cases. In 1988 a bill proposing to
double the maximum sentences for Class A, B, and C offenses was
introduced in the Maine Legislature.140 The bill was intended to ad-
dress two problems. First, as a result of a perceived increase in the
134. 590 A.2d 149 (Me. 1991).
135. 590 A.2d 538 (Me. 1991).
136. 591 A.2d 462 (Me. 1991).
137. The court reduced the sentence from 20 to 10 years in Lewis, from 40 to 12
years in Michaud, and from 30 to 15 years in Clark. See supra and infra text accom-
panying notes 151, 152, 157 & 165.
138. In St. Pierre the Law Court reduced a life sentence to a term of 45 years.
State v. St. Pierre, 584 A.2d at 622.
139. P.L. 1987, ch. 808, § 1 (codified at ME. REv STAT ANN tit. 17-A, §§
1252(2)(A), 1252-B (West Supp. 1991-1992)).
140. L.D. 2312 (113th Legis. 1988). The bill specifically sought to increase the
maximum sentence for Class A crimes from 20 to 40 years; for Class B crimes, from
10 to 20 years; and for Class C crimes, from 5 to 10 years.
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nature and seriousness of crimes being committed, the criminal jus-
tice system did not have a sufficient maximum range of sentencing
available to punish the most violent and dangerous offenders. 14 Al-
though the legislation would double the limits for these types of of-
fenses, the bill's Statement of Fact anticipated that the number of
offenders sentenced to prison would not increase. It stated, "The bill
is expected to affect less than 2 of 1% of sentenced inmates."' 142
The second problem was the reduction in sentences resulting from
automatic good-time credits.4 3 The bill would require that the sen-
tencing court specifically consider the extent to which the length of
sentence was altered by good-time laws.
During the same legislative session, an amendment was proposed
to the bill which would double the maximum sentence for Class A
offenses only." The bill, as thus amended, was enacted into law ef-
fective July 1, 1989. ", The Judiciary Committee noted that the
amended bill would not automatically double the sentence for every
Class A offender; instead, sentencing judges would have expanded
discretion in dealing with "the most heinous and violent crimes that
are committed against a person."' 4 s Unlike the original bill, the
amended legislation did not contain the same estimate that only a
very small percentage of sentenced offenders would be affected by
the proposed legislation; however, it did state that "close-to-maxi-
mum" sentences were the most likely to be affected.147
What the Legislature intended in doubling the maximum sentence
for a Class A offender is not entirely clear from the available legisla-
tive history. On the one hand, the statutory language did not place
any explicit limits on when the full range of forty years could be
considered by the sentencing judge. It merely stated that "[in the
case of a Class A crime, the court shall set a definite period not to
exceed 40 years." 8 On the other hand, the legislative history clearly
141. Id. Statement of Fact.
142. Id.
143. Id. Under the Maine Criminal Code, a sentence may be reduced by one-third
or more by the accumulation of "good-time" credits. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN tit. 17-
A, § 1253 (West Supp. 1991-1992). The bill sought to double the penalties in Class A,
B, and C crimes because the good-time laws automatically reduced the impact of the
original sentence upon the convicted criminal. The bill also sought to ensure that the
effect of the good-time laws on sentences would be considered uniformly by every
judge.
144. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 2312, No. H-720 (113th Legis. 1988). The amend-
ment also retained the mandate to consider good-time credits for all applicable clas-
ses of crimes.
145. P.L. 1987, ch. 808 (codified at ME. REV STAT ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1252(2)(A),
1252-B (West Supp. 1991-1992)).
146. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 2312, No. H-720, Statement of Fact (113th Legis.
1988).
147. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 2312, No. H-720 (113th Legis. 1988).
148. ME REV STAT ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252(2)(A) (West Supp. 1991-1992).
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indicated that the amendment was not designed to automatically
double the sentence for every Class A offense, but instead was
designed to affect primarily the "close-to-maximum" sentences.
However, just how these "close-to-maximum" sentences would be
affected by the Class A sentence bill was a matter of speculation.
Would the sentences approaching twenty years in length be auto-
matically doubled, or would they simply be the only sentences eligi-
ble for consideration in the expanded twenty-to-forty year range? As
the following three cases will show, this ambiguity in the operation
of the Class A sentence amendment was a significant factor in
prompting a change in the then less than three-year-old Appellate
Review Act.
2. The Cases
In State v. Lewis,'149 the first of the three sentence appeals, the
defendant was convicted of arson, a Class A offense.'80 On a Novem-
ber evening, Donald Lewis set fire to an unoccupied 1979 Dodge
Aspen belonging to an acquaintance. There were no reported inju-
ries. Lewis, an alcoholic, had an extensive record of felony convic-
tions, including aggravated assault and crimes involving property.
The superior court sentenced the defendant to twenty years, with all
but fifteen suspended, and six years probation. At the sentencing
hearing, the superior court specifically noted that the maximum sen-
tence for Class A crimes had been increased to forty years.'""
Lewis appealed his sentence to the Law Court, claiming that it
was excessive in length. The Law Court agreed, and reduced the
sentence from twenty to ten years, with all but eight years sus-
pended. Justice Roberts, writing for the court, set forth the follow-
ing interpretation of the legislative intent behind the Class A sen-
tence revision:
[W]e conclude that the intent was to make available two discrete
ranges of sentences for Class A crimes. For the majority of such
crimes the sentence imposed should be the same as it would have
been under the twenty-year limit. Only for the most heinous and
violent crimes committed against a person should the court in its
discretion consider imposing a basic sentence within the expanded
range of twenty to forty years.'5'
Thus, in the Law Court's view, the sentencing court in Lewis had
committed a "misapplication of principle" when it considered the
full forty-year range of sentence. Instead, since the defendant's con-
duct was not a "heinous and violent crime committed against a per-
149. 590 A.2d 149 (Me. 1991).
150. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 17-A, § 802 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991-1992).
151. State v. Lewis, 590 A.2d at 150.
152. Id. at 151 (emphasis added).
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son," the sentencing court should have applied the original twenty-
year range. Had it done so, the Law Court reasoned, it would have
found that the defendant was not deserving of twenty years, the
most serious sentence for a crime not involving heinous and violent
conduct against a person.
In Lewis Justice Roberts also departed from the sentencing proce-
dure which Justice Wathen had set forth in Hallowell. Justice Rob-
erts stated in Lewis:
In imposing sentence the court must first determine a basic sen-
tence by considering the particular nature and seriousness of the
offense, without regard to the circumstances of the offender. State
v. Hallowell, 577 A.2d 778, 781 (Me. 1990). Only after this first step
should the court apply its discretion to determine the degree of
sentence mitigation or aggravation called for by the circumstances
of the offender. Id.; State v. Constantine, 588 A.2d 294, 297 (Me.
1991). 153
Although Justice Roberts cited Hallowell as authority, the sen-
tencing scheme articulated above was different from the Hallowell
approach in two fundamental respects. First, it called for a basic
sentence, not a maximurp sentence, to be determined by the nature
of the offense. Second, that basic sentence could be decreased or in-
creased based on a consideration of the circumstances of the of-
fender. Thus, under Lewis, if the defendant had an extensive crimi-
nal record and a history of drug abuse, and showed poor prospects
for rehabilitation, the basic sentence initially determined could be
increased due to these aggravating factors.
The sentencing principles articulated in Lewis seem more sensible
and fair than those outlined in Hallowell; a defendant's aggravating
factors should have the capacity to increase a basic sentence deter-
mined by the nature of the offense. It is unclear, however, whether
the Law Court intended to create a new sentencing procedure in
Lewis or whether it was merely explaining what was not made clear
in Hallowell.
153. Id. at 150 (emphasis added). This quote illustrates the Law Court's inconsis-
tency in language in declaring sentencing principles. First, the quote cites Hallowell
as authority for the idea that a basic sentence is determined by looking at the nature
of the offense. In reality, however, the court in Hallowell stated that the maximum
sentence, not the basic sentence, is determined by considering the nature of the of-
fense. "The maximum sentence in a given case should, in the first instance, be deter-
mined by a consideration of the particular nature and seriousness of the offense
*. ." State v. Hallowell, 577 A.2d at 781 (emphasis added). Likewise, the quote
cites Constantine to support the idea that the circumstances of the offender can serve
either to mitigate or aggravate a basic sentence. But in Constantine the Law Court
made no specific mention of aggravating circumstances of the defendant. It stated,
"the sentencing court first imposes a sentence appropriate to the severity of the of-
fense, and then considers the possible existence of mitigating factors that favor a
suspended sentence or probation, including the likelihood of successful rehabilita-
tion." State v. Constantine, 588 A.2d at 297 (emphasis added).
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Only two weeks after Lewis the Law Court decided State v.
Michaud.154 In that case, the defendant apprehended two ten-year-
old girls who were picking flowers in a rural area and took them into
the woods, where he threatened to kill them if they did not keep
quiet. Once in the woods, he made them undress, and engaged in
sexual acts with each of them before he let them go.'85 The defend-
ant was convicted of two counts of gross sexual misconduct and was
sentenced to maximum twenty-year terms on each count, to be
served consecutively, for a total of forty years.""
On appeal of sentence, the Law Court reduced Michaud's sen-
tence to two concurrent fifteen-year terms of imprisonment with all
but twelve years of those sentences suspended, followed by six years
of probation. 57 The court stated that in determining a sentence, the
defendant's conduct had to be compared on a scale of seriousness to
all possible means of committing gross sexual misconduct. A maxi-
mum sentence was inappropriate in this case because, the Law
Court reasoned, "gross sexual misconduct could be committed in
much more aggravating and heinous ways."'58 The court noted that
the defendant did not expose his genitals to the girls, nor did he
make contact between his genitals and the mouth, anus, or genitals
of either girl. 59 The court also emphasized that the defendant did
not exert violent physical force upon the victims and that the entire
encounter lasted only twenty minutes. Furthermore, the Law Court
concluded that the imposition of consecutive sentences was im-
proper because the gross sexual misconduct offenses were not "un-
usually serious" in this case. 6 '
154. 590 A.2d 538 (Me. 1991).
155. Id. at 540. The defendant kissed the vagina of one of the girls, made one of
the girls kiss the other on the lips, kissed the first girl on the lips, and inserted a
device into the second girl's vagina. Id. at 542 n.8.
156. Id. at 540. Apparently the defendant was sentenced prior to the amendment
lengthening the maximum sentence for a Class A crime to 40 years. See id. at 540 n.2.
Gross sexual misconduct (now defined as gross sexual assault, see P.L. 1989, ch. 401,
§ A(4)) is a Class A crime. ME, REV STAT ANN tit. 17-A, § 253(1), (4) (West Supp.
1991-1992).
157. State v. Michaud, 590 A.2d at 545.
158. Id. at 542.
159. Id. The court also pointed out that there were more offensive ways in which
gross sexual misconduct could be committed, such as by sexual intercourse, anal in-
tercourse, fellatio, or forcing a person to have sexual contact with an animal. Id. at
543 n.11.
160. Id. at 543. In reviewing the propriety of a consecutive sentence for an abuse
of discretion, the Law Court noted that when the defendant has been given multiple
sentences, there is a statutory presumption that a sentencing court shall impose the
sentences concurrently; consecutive sentences may not be imposed unless the crimi-
nal conduct involved is "unusually serious." Id. (citing M. REV STAT ANN tit. 17-A,
§ 1256(2)(D) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991-1992) and State v. Walsh, 558 A.2d 1184, 1188
(Me. 1989)). Consecutive sentences are also permitted if the offenses are based on
different conduct or arise from different criminal episodes. ME REV STAT ANN tit.
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In Michaud, an opinion written by Justice Clifford, the Law Court
also reverted to the Hallowell approach of determining the sentence.
"The nature and seriousness of the defendant's conduct is determi-
native of the maximum sentence that may be imposed."'' This time
the court stated that both the circumstances of the offender and the
protection of the public interest should be considered once the
maximum sentence was determined, but only as mitigating factors
favoring the reduction of the sentence imposed: "The circumstances
of the offender and the protection of the public must be weighed to
determine whether and to what extent the sentences otherwise
called for by virtue of the nature and seriousness of the crime
should be reduced.'' 6 2 While the court acknowledged that aggravat-
ing factors did exist in this case, it nevertheless concluded that these
were offset by countervailing mitigating circumstances, which re-
quired the suspension of a portion of the defendant's sentence.1 3
Finally, in State v. Clark,'6 4 an opinion written by Justice
Wathen, the Law Court reduced a thirty-year term of imprisonment
17-A, § 1256(2)(A) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991-1992). However, the Law Court con-
cluded that the acts in Michaud "were so much a part of a single criminal episode
[that it would] be inappropriate to make the sentences consecutive." State v.
Michaud, 590 A.2d at 544 n.15.
Current Maine law does not allow the imposition of consecutive sentences where
there is more than one victim. However, as a result of Michaud, further legislation
may be introduced in the next legislative session to address this issue. According to
legislative debate on the proposed amendments to the Appellate Review Act (L.D.
1932), which took place on June 19, 1991, in the House of Representatives, Represen-
tative Patrick Paradis made the following statements on the House floor:
[The Judiciary Committee] will be drafting specific language ... before the
next session . . . [concerning] the idea expressed by the [Law Court] in
State v. Michaud that a person should get concurrent sentences rather than
consecutive sentences for attacking multiple victims. It is inconceivable to
me that the court should look upon a double rape as a "two-for-one sale."
That was not our intent in drafting the consecutive sentencing section of
the criminal code, and every member of the Judiciary Committee, I believe,
is appalled at the callousness of the court in rewarding the defendant in
Michaud for taking "only twenty minutes" to attack two little girls whose
lives have been transformed forever ....
Legis. Rec. (Proof), H-1227 (1st Reg. Sess. 1991) (statement of Representative Para-
dis), House of Representatives, June 19, 1991.
161. State v. Michaud, 590 A.2d at 542 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Hallo-
well, 577 A.2d at 781).
162. Id. at 544 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Hallowell, 577 A.2d at 781-82).
163. Id. The defendant's aggravating circumstances included the following: two
prior convictions for criminal assault and one for criminal threatening; lack of re-
morse; and mental illness that, although successfully treated in the past, had gotten
out of control due to the defendant's more recent refusal to submit to treatment.
Defendant's countervailing mitigating factors included no felony criminal record and
no prior conviction for sexual offenses, a history of being raised in a dysfunctional
family, and mental illness treatable with hospitalization and medication. Id.
164. 591 A.2d 462 (Me. 1991).
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for a gross sexual assault conviction to fifteen years.'65 In that case,
the defendant, Mark Clark, offered to walk a sixteen-year-old high
school student home from her sister's apartment late one night. On
the way home, he grabbed the young woman by the throat, dragged
her into the bushes, and forced her face-first into the ground with
his arms around her throat. He then opened her shirt, grabbed her
breasts, and threatened to knock her out if she did not keep quiet.
After removing her pants, underwear, and a tampon, he had sexual
intercourse with her but did not ejaculate.'16
At the time of the offense the defendant, a thirty-three-year-old,
had four prior burglary convictions, a probation violation, several
misdemeanor convictions, and a history of alcoholism. On appeal of
his sentence, he argued that the sentencing court improperly failed
to consider the goal of rehabilitation. Nevertheless, the Law Court
held that the sentencing court adequately considered rehabilitation
and committed no error in determining that the prospects for reha-
bilitation were outweighed by other factors.' 7
However, although the issue was not raised on appeal, the Law
Court sua sponte examined the propriety of the sentence and deter-
mined that it was excessive in length in light of the recent increase
of the maximum Class A sentence from twenty to forty years. The
court cited Lewis for the interpretation that the Legislature had cre-
ated a two-tiered system of Class A crimes whereby only the most
"heinous and violent crimes" could be punished in the expanded
twenty- to forty-year range.' 8 In the opinion, Justice Wathen rea-
soned that gross sexual assault offenses did not deserve punishment
in the expanded Class A range unless they involved either a weapon
or a "heightened degree of violence, injury, torture, or depravity."'0 0
Although the court acknowledged that the defendant's use of force,
violence, and degradation ranked high on the scale of seriousness for
all sexual assaults, it still concluded that the defendant's sentence
was excessive because, "[c]omparing defendant's conduct against all
the possible means of committing gross sexual assault, however, we
cannot conclude that it ranks at or near the very top of that
scale." 170
165. Id. at 464-65. At the time of sentencing, the Class A sentence amendment
had taken effect, and the superior court had a maximum of 40 years statutorily avail-
able to it in determining the defendant's sentence.
166. State v. Clark, 591 A.2d at 463.






IV. REFORMING THE 1989 APPELLATE REVIEW ACT
A. Reaction to the Lewis Cases
Almost immediately after the decisions in Lewis, Michaud, and
Clark were published, the Law Court encountered strong criticism
on several fronts. In particular, various victim rights groups pro-
tested the Law Court's seeming insensitivity to the victims in those
decisions and its willingness to reduce sentences based on what ap-
peared to be nothing more than its own opinion of "heinousness."'
In addition, the prosecutorial community was alarmed that the Ap-
pellate Review Act had made the discretion of the sentencing court
virtually a dead letter.1 2
Where public reaction to the Lewis trilogy was strong, reform was
equally swift in following. On June 6, 1991, an emergency bill was
proposed to modify the appellate sentence review procedure in light
of the three controversial cases. 173 The original bill was amended,
171. At a press conference at the State House on May 15, 1991, Laura A.
Fortman, Chair of the Maine Coalition Against Rape, was quoted as follows: "These
decisions negate all of the progress we have made to date .... The message being
given by our Supreme Court to perpetrators is that, in Maine, sexually assaulting
children and adolescents is not in and of itself 'violent enough' or 'depraved enough'
to warrant the maximum or near-maximum sentence." Peter Jackson, Court Criti-
cized for Reducing Terms in 3 Criminal Cases, BANGOR DAILY NEws, May 16, 1991,
at 5. At the same press conference, Marilyn Owen Robb, head of the Maine Chapter
of Mothers Against Drunk Driving, stated, "With the precedent-setting decision here,
we may look to the near future when the court will decide that the drunk driver who
kills only two people in the other car does not deserve the maximum sentence be-
cause there was room for three more in the back seat." Id.
172. According to District Attorney Janet Mills, president of the Maine Prosecu-
tors Association, sentencing should be left to the trial court judge, who has heard the
evidence in the case and observed the defendant. Her reaction to the three decisions
was that "[tihey ... are sitting up there in their ivory tower and picking out a num-
ber without eyeballing the defendant or hearing from any witnesses. I think that
strikes at everybody's gut as wrong." Gary J. Remal, Paradis Wants Courts to Take
Heed of Clarification, KENNEBEC JOURNAL, June 18, 1991, at 1.
173. L.D. 1932 (115th Legis. 1991), entitled "An Act to Correct a Conflict in the
Law Relating to Sentencing Considerations and Appellate Review." Two major
changes proposed in the original bill were not enacted in the final emergency legisla-
tion. According to the House and Senate chairs of the Joint Standing Committee on
the Judiciary, these two changes were not enacted only because of time constraints.
See infra note 200.
The first of these was intended to clarify the intent behind P.L. 1987, ch. 808, the
Class A sentence amendment that increased the maximum sentence for Class A
crimes to 40 years, and to send a message to the Law Court that its interpretation of
a two-tiered system of Class A crimes was wrong. The original bill proposed that the
Law Court's standard of review in a sentence appeal be for an abuse of discretion
only. Section 2 of the original bill (not enacted) proposed an addition to the statute
of a new § 2154-A providing:
§ 2154-A. Discretion of the sentencing court
The review of any sentence by the Supreme Judicial Court may be for
abuse of discretion by the sentencing court only. Nothing in this chapter
may be construed by the Supreme Judicial Court to limit the discretion of
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and, as enacted on June 30, 1991,174 made three major changes to
the 1989 Appellate Review Act."78
The first change modified the language of one of the objectives of
sentence review. It repealed former section 2154(1) of the Act, which
had provided:
The general objectives of sentence review by the Supreme Judicial
Court are:
1. Sentence Correction. To correct a sentence which is excessive
in length, having regard to the nature of the offense, the character
of the offender and the protection of the public interest.'"
In its place the emergency legislation substituted the following
language:
The general objectives of sentence review by the Supreme Judicial
Court are:
1. Sentence Correction. To provide for the correction of
sentences imposed without due regard for the sentencing factors
set forth in this chapter.'"
the sentencing court in exercising the full statutory range of punishments
after due consideration of all the sentencing criteria and sentencing consid-
erations provided in this chapter. The means or method employed by a de-
fendant to commit a particular offense may not be used by the Supreme
Judicial Court to establish a maximum sentence that is less than the sen-
tence established by the class of that offense. All sentences must reflect the
full consideration by the sentencing court of all applicable sentencing
criteria.
L.D. 1932, § 2 (115th Legis. 1991).
The original bill also sought to address the decision in Michaud, in which the Law
Court changed the defendant's sentence from two consecutive terms to two concur-
rent terms because it determined that his conduct was part of one criminal episode
even though there were two victims involved. Specifically, the bill proposed to amend
the statutory guidelines for multiple sentencing, Ma REV STAT ANN tit. 17-A. §
1256(2) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991-1992), to include a definition of "criminal episode"
whereby "[c]riminal acts against different victims constitute different criminal epi-
sodes." L.D. 1932, § 6 (115th Legis. 1991). See supra note 153. This proposed change
was also not enacted into law.
174. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 1932, No. H-662 (115th Legis. 1991) (enacted by
P.L. 1991, ch. 525, and codified at ME. REV STAT ANN tit 15, §§ 2151-2157 (West
1989 & Supp. 1991-1992)). The amended bill, proposed on June 12, 1991, became
effective on June 30, 1991, since it was enacted as emergency legislation. See ME.
CONST., art. 4, pt. 3, § 16. On June 19, 1991, the House of Representatives voted 125 -
1 to enact the amended version of L.D. 1932. Also on that date, the Senate approved
the legislation by a vote of 29 - 1. Legis. Rec. (Proof) H-1227 (1st Reg. Sess. 1991).
175. For a more detailed comparison of the changes proposed in LD. 1932 and
those eventually adopted in the amended version of L.D. 1932, see Supplemental
Brief of Appellee on Sentence Appeal at 15-24, State v. Gosselin, 600 A.2d 1108 (Me.
1992) (No. 90-394).
176. P.L. 1989, ch. 218 (codified at MF. REv STAT ANN tit. 15, § 2154(1) (West
Supp. 1989)) (repealed 1991).




This change seemed to remove the limitation in the Act that the
Law Court correct only sentences which are excessive in length. Af-
ter the emergency reform, one interpretation is that the Law Court
can also correct sentences which are too lenient. In a sense, this in-
terpretation is inaccurate because the sentencing court on remand
may still not impose a more severe sentence than that from which
the defendant has appealed.178 However, the interpretation may be
valid in another sense, since the Law Court still can (and should)
review sentence appeals in which the sentence is inadequate and
pronounce rational sentencing principles, even though the court can-
not increase a sentence. Thus, the Law Court can still satisfy its
mandated task of declaring sentencing guidelines even if it reviews a
sentence appeal from an arguably inadequate sentence.
The second main change, addressing the propriety of a sentence,
specifically added victim impact to the factors to be considered on
sentence review. The language modifying section 2155 of the 1989
Appellate Review Act reads (deletions are struck out; additions are
underlined):
§ 2155. Factors to be Considered by Supreme Judicial
Court.
In reviewing a criminal sentence, the Supreme Judicial Court is -au
thriz..to shall consider:
1. Propriety of Sentence. The propriety of the sentence, having
regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender,
and the protection of the public interest, the effect of the offense
on the victim and any other relevant sentencing factors recognized
under law[.]'" 9
By the above provision, the Legislature sought to clarify that the
Law Court is required on appeal to consider all the same sentencing
factors as the sentencing court, including victim impact. The "State-
ment of Fact" section of the Judiciary Committee's amendment to
L.D. 1932 (which was enacted) provides an explanation of the legis-
lative intent behind this change.180 It states:
The purpose of this amendment is to modify the sentencing re-
view factors in light of certain recent decisions of the Maine Su-
preme Judicial Court. Decisions such as State v. Lewis, No. -
(Me. April 19, 1991); State v. Michaud, No. - (Me. May 2,
1991); and State v. Clark, No. - (Me. May 13, 1991), reveal the
conflict between the sentencing criteria in the Maine Criminal
Code and the appellate review provisions in the Maine Revised
178. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
179. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 1932, § 2, No. H-662 (115th Legis. 1991) (enacted
by P.L. 1991, ch. 525, § 2, and codified at ME. REV STAT ANN. tit. 15, § 2155 (West
Supp. 1991-1992)).
180. "The 'Statement of Fact' attached to an act's legislative document is a
proper and compelling aid to ascertaining legislative purpose and intent." Franklin
Property Trust v. Foresite, Inc., 438 A.2d 218, 223 (Me. 1981).
[Vol. 44:345
APPELLATE SENTENCE REVIEW
Statutes, Title 15, chapter 306-A. The Title 17-A provisions con-
tain a number of criteria to be considered by the sentencing court
in every criminal case and a conflict occurs because different fac-
tors are indicated in the Title 15 review process. This amendment
resolves the apparent conflict that has arisen as a result of the dif-
ferent statutory mandates.
This amendment includes factors that a sentencing judge consid-
ers as the factors the Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as a reviewing
court, is required to consider. In addition to the nature of the of-
fense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public
interest, this amendment requires the court to consider the effect
of the offense on the victim and any other relevant sentencing fac-
tors recognized under law. The term "law" is used to refer to not
only statutorily required factors, but also considerations that have
been developed through case law. The court is required to consider
the criminal record of the defendant by the current law inclusion of
"the character of the offender" as a factor. 8'
Although the specific inclusion of victim impact in the section
above may have been redundant (as the Law Court had already ac-
knowledged victim impact to be a valid sentencing factor in Con-
stantine),'1 2 the Legislature included the language for emphasis.
Here the Legislature was responding in part to the Law Court's per-
ceived failure to consider victim impact in Michaud and Clark, and
generally, to the court's failure to articulate clearly the proper role
of this factor in sentencing decisions. The amendment makes clear
the legislative intent that the Law Court be required to consider vic-
tim impact specifically before it reduces a sentence based on
propriety.
Perhaps the most significant of the three changes enacted by the
emergency legislation was the removal of the Law Court's authority
to reduce sentences directly in cases in which it determines that re-
lief should be granted. This reform was intended to limit the Law
Court's sentence review powers to a remand to the trial court for
resentencing because of a perceived encroachment on the province
of the sentencing court.1 8 3 The language as enacted reads as follows:
1-A. Remand. If the Supreme Judicial Court determines that re-
lief should be granted, it must remand the case to the court that
181. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 1932, Statement of Fact (115th Legis. 1991) (em-
phasis added).
182. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
183. Another reason advanced for limiting the Law Court's authority to a remand
was the perceived benefit of bringing the victim (or victim's family) and the defend-
ant together at resentencing. Since the victim has the right to be heard by the court
at the time of sentencing, see MF. Rav STAT ANN tit. 17-A, § 12.57(2) (West Supp.
1991-1992), and the defendant has a similar right of allocution, Ma R Ciwt P
32(a)(2), the theory is that both parties would achieve a catharsis at resentencing
before the trial court which they would otherwise be deprived of if the Law Court
were to reduce the defendant's sentence directly. See, e.g., infra note 187.
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imposed the sentence for any further proceeding that could have
been conducted prior to the imposition of the sentence under re-
view and for resentencing on the basis of such further proceedings
provided that the sentence is not more severe than the sentence
appealed. 84
The legislative mandate was clear. The Law Court would no
longer have the authority to impose substitute sentences in those
cases which required relief, but instead would have to remand the
case to the sentencing court for resentencing. The rationale behind
removing the Law Court's power to reduce sentences was further ex-
plained in the "Statement of Fact" of the amended version of L.D.
1932:
This amendment requires the Supreme Judicial Court to remand
the case to the sentencing court for resentencing if relief from the
original sentence is necessary. The Supreme Judicial Court is not
authorized to substitute its own sentence for the trial court sen-
tence. The sentencing court has had the opportunity to view the
defendant through the course of a trial or other court proceeding
and has had the opportunity to view the victim of the defendant's
crime.""1
This reasoning is not convincing in all cases. Admittedly, the sen-
tencing judge who has observed the defendant's demeanor at trial
may be better informed to determine a proper sentence. However, in
most cases this advantage is not present because the defendant has
pleaded guilty, thereby foregoing trial."8 Thus, in the vast majority
184. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 1932, § 4, No. H-662 (115th Legis. 1991) (enacted
by P.L. 1991, ch. 525, § 4, and codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2156(1-A)
(West Supp. 1991-1992)). This language replaced that of the earlier law, which read:
1. Substitution of Sentence or Remand. If the Supreme Judicial
Court determines that relief should be granted, it may:
A. Substitute for the sentence under review any other disposition that
was open to the sentencing court, provided however, that the sentence sub-
stituted shall not be more severe than the sentence appealed; or
B. Remand the case to the court that imposed the sentence for any fur-
ther proceedings that could have been conducted prior to the imposition of
the sentence under review and for resentencing on the basis of such further
proceedings, provided however, that the sentence shall not be more severe
than the sentence originally imposed.
2. Affirmation of Sentence. If the Supreme Judicial Court determines
that relief should not be granted, it shall affirm the sentence under review.
P.L. 1989, ch. 218 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2156(1) (West Supp.
1989)) (repealed 1991).
185. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 1932, Statement of Fact (115th Legis. 1991) (em-
phasis added).
186. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR
1989 STATE OF MAINE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 112. According to this report, from 1983
to 1988 there were 32,266 guilty pleas in Maine's superior courts, which disposed of
between 81.1% and 88.8% of all criminal cases. See also Connecticut Case Study,
supra note 26, at 1465.
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of cases which come before it, the Law Court has access to the same
information as the sentencing judge and is no less able to determine
a proper sentence in these situations.
Nonetheless, the speedy legislative response to the Lewis cases il-
lustrates the level of concern over the Appellate Review Act's distri-
bution of sentencing power. Clearly the Legislature was uncomforta-
ble with the Law Court's direct influence on sentencing under the
Act, notwithstanding the fact that the Legislature itself had given
the court a broad mandate to create a body of sentencing law in
Maine. A majority of the Maine public apparently believed that the
Law Court's creation of sentencing guidelines was acceptable in the-
ory, but the application of those guidelines through the reduction of
sentences was, upon reflection, a task which properly belonged
within the province of the trial court's discretion.'8 7
B. Analysis: Failures and Successes of the Process
1. The Class A Sentence Amendment
Removing the Law Court's authority to reduce sentences directly
did not solve all of the problems in the Lewis cases. In fact, in its
haste to reform the Appellate Review Act, the Legislature failed to
address the main problem in those cases: the Law Court's interpre-
tation of the Class A sentence amendment as creating two discrete
ranges of sentences. As mentioned above, 8 8 the Law Court's adop-
tion of a two-tiered system of Class A sentences was chiefly respon-
sible for that court's sentence reductions in the Lewis cases, and
hence the resulting impression that it had departed from the "mis-
application of principle" standard of review pronounced in
Hallowell.
Because the intent behind the Class A sentence amendment was
unclear from the statutory language and legislative history, different
187. In legislative debate of the amended version of L.D. 1932, one legislator
showed his discomfort with the notion of an appellate court, equipped only with a
record before it, limiting the discretion of sentencing judges to determine appropriate
sentences:
Section 4 of this bill requires the Supreme Judicial Court to remand the
case for another sentencing hearing if it finds that the sentence imposed
was in error. This is important because all too often of late, the Law Court
has determined that the sentence was wrong and, instead of sending the
case back to the sentencing judge to reconsider the matter, they have just
literally picked a number out of the air, with no explanation and without
ever having seen or heard from the defendant or the victim in the case.
That is wrong and the members of the Judiciary feel strongly that there
must be another hearing, usually before the same judge who originally
heard the case, and all parties will have a right to be heard again on recon-
sideration of the sentence following the dictates of the Law Court.
Leg. Rec. (Proof) 1227 (1st Reg. Sess. 1991) (statement of Rep. Paradis). HISIL-e o,
Representatives, June 19, 1991.
188. See supra part III.B(1).
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interpretations were possible. As mentioned above,189 one such inter-
pretation was that the amendment was intended to expand the dis-
cretion of sentencing judges by giving them the full sentencing range
of up to forty years for all Class A offenses. Certainly on its face the
pertinent statutory language supports this interpretation. "In the
case of a Class A crime, the court shall set a definite period not to
exceed 40 years ... ."19o In addition, some support for this inter-
pretation may be found in the legislative history. For example, one
legislator described the intent of the legislation in the following way:
"The intent of that bill was to allow the sentencing judge a great
deal of leeway when dealing with Class A crimes, which are by defi-
nition, the most serious and heinous crimes on the books." '
However, this interpretation of the Class A sentence amendment
is not entirely consistent with the legislative history. An alternative
interpretation of the amendment is that a small percentage of Class
A crimes-only the most heinous and violent-were intended to be
affected by the legislation.'9 2 One of the main purposes of this legis-
lation was to reduce the impact of the good-time laws on sentences
imposed upon the "most serious and violent criminals.' 1 93 In addi-
tion, the legislative history indicates that only those crimes commit-
ted against a person (as opposed to property offenses), and not all
Class A offenses, were targeted for the expanded range of sen-
tence.194 Under this interpretation, then, the Class A crimes affected
189. Id.
190. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 2312 (113th Legis. 1988) (enacted by P.L. 1987, ch.
808, and codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN tit. 17-A, § 1252(2)(A) (West Supp. 1991-
1992)).
191. Leg. Rec. (Proof) H-1226 (1st Reg. Sess. 1991) (statement of Rep. Paradis),
House of Representatives, June 19, 1991 (emphasis added), debating L.D. 1932, An
Act to Correct a Conflict in the Law Relating to Sentencing Considerations and Ap-
pellate Review.
192. For example, pertinent language in the bill states:
2. The bill would not automatically double the length of sentence for every
Class A offender. . . . [A] judge who currently imposes a 10-year sentence
for a Class A offense, for which 20 years is allowable by law, is highly un-
likely to begin handing down 20-year sentences for the same offense after
enactment of this bill.
3. . . .It is the "close-to-maximum" sentences that are. most likely to be
affected ....
Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 2312 (113th Legis. 1988).
193. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 2312, Statement of Fact (113th Legis. 1988). Under
Maine good-time laws, a criminal sentence can be automatically reduced by up to
one-third. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1253(3) (West Supp. 1991-1992). Thus,
prior to P.L. 1987, ch. 808, "good time" Class A offenders sentenced to the maximum
twenty-year period were actually incarcerated for a period of about thirteen years.
194. The Statement of Fact of the bill which was eventually enacted noted that
the crimes intended to be affected by the legislation were those committed against a
person, rather than property offenses. The bill specifically targets "the most heinous
and violent crimes that are committed against a person. The amendment does not
increase the penalties for crimes committed against property." Comm. Amend. A to
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by an expanded penalty of up to forty years would include at-
tempted murder, manslaughter, and gross sexual assault; but not ar-
son, robbery, or burglary when armed by a firearm, unless those of-
fenses involved serious bodily injury to another person or threats
thereof. 95
If the intent of the Legislature was indeed to reduce the impact of
the good-time laws and to expand the range of sentence for only the
most serious conduct against a person, then increasing the maxi-
mum sentence for all Class A offenses across the board was a rather
imprecise way to achieve those goals. At least two alternatives come
to mind. First, if the impact of good-time laws on sentences were the
main problem, the solution would be to change the good-time laws
directly, 9 6 not the maximum Class A sentence. Second, if the objec-
tive was to punish the most heinous crimes committed against a per-
son, then those crimes only-attempted murder, manslaughter,
etc.-should be specifically targeted and classified into a new cate-
gory of offense whose maximum sentence is forty years. Instead, by
increasing the maximum sentence for all Class A offenses to forty
years,othe Legislature disturbed the proportionality of sentences es-
tablished by Maine's Criminal Code' in 1976 and mandated by the
state constitution.19 8
Regardless of what the Legislature really intended in enacting the
Class A sentence amendment, there was nothing in the statutory
language of the amendment itself to indicate that only certain types
of crimes were to be considered in the expanded forty-year range.
Thus, the Law Court's adoption of two discrete ranges of
sentences-a regular Class A and a "super" Class A range-was a
somewhat strained interpretation of the language itself.190 Even the
legislative history, which predicted that only close-to-maximum
sentences would be affected, does not support an automatic two-
tiered system without some creativity.
Notwithstanding the Law Court's strained interpretation of the
Class A amendment, the Legislature was perhaps a bit too quick to
L.D. 2312, Statement of Fact (113th Legis. 1988).
195. See Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 2312, Statement of Fact (113th Legis. 1988).
196. For example, the one-third automatic deduction could be changed to a
smaller fraction of the sentence. Or, alternatively, deduction for good time could be
made discretionary rather than automatic. See infra part V.
197. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991-1992). The
Criminal Law Advisory Commission opposed the original bill proposing to double the
maximum sentences for Class A, B, and C crimes because of the "disproportion that
it would create between the enhanced sentences for Class A. B and C crimes, and the
unaffected sentences for Class D and E crimes." State v. Lewis, 590 A.2d at 150 n.3.
198. Article I, § 9 of the Maine Constitution states in part that "all penalties and
punishments shall be proportioned to the offence .... " ME CoNs? arL 1, § 9.
199. The Law Court may have adopted this interpretation in order to reduce the




respond. In passing the emergency bill, it seemed more concerned
with sending a clear message to the Law Court that it had over-
stepped its bounds in the sentencing process than in addressing the
critical problem. A direct and appropriate legislative response to the
problems in the Lewis cases would have included a clarification of
the intent behind the Class A sentence amendment, i.e., a correction
(or endorsement) of the Law Court's interpretation in Lewis2 00 Had
the Legislature taken a slower, less reactionary approach, it might
well have waited until the next legislative session to propose a com-
prehensive solution to the problems in the Lewis cases, including a
clarification of the Class A sentence amendment.2 01
2. The Law Court's Inconsistency in Pronouncing
Sentencing Guidelines
The Legislature's emergency bill did provide some necessary di-
200. Although the original emergency bill (L.D. 1932) modifying the Appellate
Review Act indirectly addressed the Law Court's interpretation of the Class A sen-
tence amendment, this proposed change was not enacted along with the final
amended legislation on June 30, 1991. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
According to both the House and Senate Chairs of the Joint Standing Committee on
the Judiciary, changes addressing the Law Court's interpretation of P.L. 1987, ch.
808, the Class A sentence amendment, in Lewis were not enacted with the emergency
legislation due to time constraints only. Both chairs also indicated that further legis-
lation would be introduced in the next session to address this issue. Leg. Rec. (Proof)
H-1226 (1st Reg. Sess. 1991) (statement of Rep. Paradis), House of Representatives,
June 19, 1991; Leg. Rec. (Proof) S-1237 (1st Reg. Sess. 1991) (statement of Sen.
Gauvreau), Senate, June 12, 1991.
201. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. The question arises at this junc-
ture whether it is prudent for the legislative branch to change the internal procedures
of a judicially-operated mechanism (criminal sentencing) whenever it disagrees with
the result in particular decisions. Once given a broad legislative mandate, the judici-
ary should be allowed to determine procedures for carrying out its duties. Legislative
intervention in those procedures has a chilling effect on judicial independence and
hampers the judiciary's ability to fulfill its mandate. In this case, an argument can be
made that since the Law Court was given a broad mandate under the Appellate Re-
view Act to reduce disparity in sentencing and to develop rational sentencing guide-
lines, the Legislature should not remove the procedural tools to accomplish that goal,
i.e., the Law Court's power to reduce sentences. If sentencing is to remain a judicial
task, then it would seem that telling a court how it should determine sentences and
what procedural tools it should have available to it is an inappropriate legislative
function. Senator Paul Gauvreau, in legislative debate on the bill reforming the ap-
pellate review statute, raised some important questions concerning sentencing in
Maine:
To what extent should this Legislature involve itself in restricting or limit-
ing the flexibility of sentencing justices to fashion appropriate sentences?
To what extent should this Legislature restrict our law court in the devel-
opment of a substantive law of Sentencing in Trial Courts?. . . [Tihese are
major policy considerations as we know Maine like most states in the coun-
try have [sic] significant overcrowding in our corrections facilities.




rection to the Law Court in another critical area-the consideration
of all sentencing factors recognized under law. In order for appellate
review of sentences to work effectively, it is essential to first estab-
lish the proper relationship among the three components of a sen-
tence: the nature of the offense; the circumstances of the offender;
and the protection of the public interest. However, in the eight cases
decided under the 1989 Appellate Review Act, the Law Court failed
to consistently and clearly articulate the most basic notions of how a
sentence should be determined.
As the cases discussed above illustrate, the Law Court's sentenc-
ing guidelines created confusion because they proposed two very dif-
ferent approaches to determining an ultimate sentence. Under the
Hallowell approach proposed by Justice Wathen, the maximum sen-
tence was to be determined based on the nature and seriousness of
the offense, followed by a consideration of the circumstances of the
offender, which could serve only to reduce the ultimate sentence.
But after the court followed the Hallowell approach in several cases,
Justice Roberts announced a different approach in Lewis: a basic
sentence was to be established based on the nature and seriousness
of the offense; then the circumstances of the offender could be con-
sidered a mitigating or aggravating factor which could either reduce
or increase the basic sentence. The confusion over which sentencing
approach the Law Court had adopted was exacerbated by the opin-
ion in Michaud, in which Justice Clifford, writing for the court only
two weeks after its decision in Lewis, once again subscribed to the
approach taken in HalloweU.202
Another source of confusion in the cases was the Law Court's fail-
ure to articulate how the third sentencing component-protection of
the public interest-should be considered, what factors should be
considered in that category, and whether those factors should be
mitigating or aggravating factors. By changing the language of sec-
tion 2155(1) of the Appellate Review Act to include "the effect of
the offense on the victim and any other relevant sentencing factors
recognized under law,"203 the Legislature made clear that the nature
of the offense and the character of the offender are just two of the
many factors that a sentencing court and the Law Court on appeal
must consider (in other words, the Law Court cannot ignore all the
202. The inconsistent application of sentencing approaches in these three cases
may have been caused more by a difference in opinion between judges about sentenc-
ing theory than by imprecise language. Indeed, one inference that can be drawn from
these cases is that Justice Wathen in Hallowell had a different theory about the role
of aggravating circumstances of the offender in sentencing than Justice Roberts had
in Lewis. This difference was eventually resolved in State v. Weir, 600 A.2d 1105
(Me. 1991), an opinion written by Justice Roberts in which the court clarified that
aggravating circumstances of the offender could increase a basic sentence. See zinra
notes 232-233 and accompanying text.
203. ME REV STAT ANN. tit. 15, § 2155(1) (West Supp. 1991-1992).
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sentencing factors except two in evaluating a sentence for propri-
ety). The new language emphasized that one such factor which the
court must consider is victim impact-a factor which the Law Court
should have but did not give explicit treatment to in either Michaud
or Clark.
The legislative history of L.D. 1932 (the amended version) sug-
gests that the Legislature was trying to tell the Law Court that it
needed to clarify its approach to sentencing. The Statement of Fact
of that bill states in part, "The court is required to consider the
criminal record of the defendant by the current law inclusion of 'the
character of the offender' as a factor."20 4 Thus, if a defendant had a
prior criminal record, this would presumably be an aggravating fac-
tor which could increase a basic sentence determined by the nature
of the offense. The comments in legislative debate of Representative
Patrick Paradis, House Chair of the Joint Standing Committee on
the Judiciary, are also revealing:
[Tihis bill [is] intended to address the court's decisions in State v.
Hallowell, State v. Clark, State v. Michaud, etc., which states very
clear [sic], but erroneously, that the maximum sentence should be
determined solely by the nature of the conduct involved, blinding
the court to the burglar's 3 prior convictions, the rapist's prior as-
saults or the horrendous terrifying effect of a sexual attack on two
ten-year old girls.
Thus, under the language of the current bill, the reviewing court
should look at whether the sentencing judge properly considered
all appropriate factors, including all those factors which we have
set out in Title 17-A, such as deductions for good time, victim im-
pact, restitution, public safety and probable rehabilitation210
Thus, the bill clearly endorsed the Law Court's "basic sentence"
approach to sentencing in Lewis as opposed to the "maximum sen-
tence" approach of Hallowell.
3. A Single Scale of Punishment for Each Offense
Finally, the Law Court encountered strong public criticism for its
reasoning in the Lewis cases that the crimes could have been com-
mitted in more heinous ways. Although the court may not have used
the most tactful or sensitive language in these opinions, it was cor-
rectly attempting to place the criminal conduct in those cases on a
single continuum for each applicable offense.206 This effort, though
204. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 1932, Statement of Fact, No. H-662 (115th Legis.
1991).
205. Leg. Rec. (Proof) H-1227 (1st Reg. Sess. 1991) (statement of Rep. Paradis),
House of Representatives, June 19, 1991 (emphasis added).
206. The notion of placing an offender's acts on a uniform scale of seriousness was
not a novel one in Lewis, Michaud, and Clark. Under the 1989 Appellate Review Act,
the Law Court first mentioned the idea of a "continuum" in State v. St. Pierre. See
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criticized as an abandonment of deference to the trial court, is fun-
damentally important to the reduction of sentencing disparity.
Without a unified frame of reference as to the seriousness of the
crime, similar offenders stand the chance of receiving grossly dispa-
rate sentences. The Law Court seems the natural choice for identify-
ing in broad terms where on a continuum a particular crime should
lie. This is not because the Law Court's collective judgment is any
better than that of an individual sentencing court judge, but because
the application of a single scale identified by one consistent body
will better achieve sentencing consistency than several scales deter-
mined by individual trial court judges.
It is argued that some offenses by their very nature deserve pun-
ishment at the top of a given scale even though one could imagine
more violent ways to commit them. With the exception of murder,
however, our criminal justice system cannot afford to do this, for
two reasons. First, this theory would directly undermine Maine's
constitutional mandate that "all penalties and punishments shall be
proportioned to the offence .... ,,1o If punishment is to be based
upon moral blameworthiness, then it should be arranged on a scale
roughly corresponding to the comparative seriousness of the offense.
Only the most grave offense should receive the maximum punish-
ment, for if several offenses of different seriousness were to receive
the same maximum punishment, the moral distinctions between
them would be lost and the public would lose faith in the ability of
the criminal justice system to mete out just punishment.208 Second,
supra note 117 and accompanying text. The "continuum" idea was followed thereaf-
ter in State v. Rolerson. In affirming a 40-year murder sentence in that case, the Law
Court stated: "The nature and seriousness of Rolerson's conduct falls somewhere in
the middle on a continuum of acts ... and a forty-year sentence does not reflect
misapplication of sentencing principles." State v. Rolerson, 593 A.2d 220, 222-23 (Me.
1991).
207. ME CONST. art. I, § 9.
208. For example, New Hampshire's Constitution provides:
All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offense ...
Where the same undistinguishing severity is exerted against all offenses, the
people are led to forget the real distinction in the crimes themselves, and to
commit the most flagrant with as little compunction as they do the lightest
offenses.
N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 18. Blackstone also commented on the need for proportionality
between punishment and the relative seriousness of the offense:
It is a kind of quackery in government to apply the same universal remedy
in every case of difficulty ...
[A] scale of crimes should be formed, with a corresponding scale of
punishments, descending from the greatest to the least. . . . Where men
see no distinction made in the nature and gradations of punishment, they
will be led to conclude, there is no distinction in the guilt. Thus, in France,
the punishment of robbery, with or without murder, is the same, hence rob-
bery is usually accompanied with murder. In China, murderers are cut to
pieces and robbers not, hence robbery often occurs on the highway, while
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such a theory would have the effect of incarcerating more offenders
for a longer period of time. Without the development of intermedi-
ate forms of punishment, Maine's criminal justice system literally
could not afford the prison space that would be required to accom-
modate this notion of punishment.2 0 9
In the Lewis cases, then, the Law Court was merely fulfilling its
mandate under the appellate review statute by developing sentenc-
ing guidelines which fixed general scales of punishment for a given
offense. In order to establish an appellate review system that could
achieve sentencing consistency, it was inevitable that the Law Court
would have to change a few sentences in the beginning to establish
uniform scales of punishment. The real problem, however, was that
there was significant disagreement about how severe the scale of
punishment actually was. For example, in Clark the issue was not
only the Law Court's determination of where on the scale of gross
sexual assault the offender's conduct belonged, but how long the
scale was. Since the Law Court's scale was twenty years long, and
the sentencing court's scale was forty, a reduction in sentence on
appeal was inevitable. Nevertheless, the Law Court's actions were
perceived as unduly limiting sentencing court discretion, an outcome
the public was clearly not ready to accept.
C. The Impact of Emergency Legislation on Appellate Review
In its original conception, the Appellate Review Act's broad objec-
tive was to develop fair and principled sentencing practices so that
different sentences would not be based solely on the individual phi-
losophies of different judges. This goal can be further divided into
two parts: (a) the development of a common law of sentencing prin-
ciples to guide the discretion of the sentencing court; and (b) the
reduction of disparity in criminal sentences. After the enactment of
the emergency legislation in June, 1991, reforming the statute, the
question arises whether the appellate review mechanism still can
achieve those goals. As the following analysis illustrates, the emer-
gency reform bill may hinder the Law Court in effectively reducing
the number of disparate sentences, but it does not affect the court's
ability to pronounce sentencing guidelines.
murders are unusual.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 590 (New York, L. K.
Strouse & Co. 1892).
209. In November 1991, Maine voters rejected a proposed $5.5 million bond issue
to expand Maine's prison space-the third time a prison bond issue was voted down
in as many elections. William C. Hidlay, Defeat of Bond Issues Sends Clear Message,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Nov. 7, 1991, at 5D. According to Corrections Commis-
sioner Donald Allen, "The overcrowding is going to continue, but voters are basically
saying they want criminals locked up, they want them punished, but they don't want
to pay for it. They can't have it both ways." Id.
[Vol. 44:345
APPELLATE SENTENCE REVIEW
1. Reduction of Sentencing Disparity
Removing the Law Court's power to reduce sentences directly lim-
its the effectiveness of the appellate review mechanism in two ways.
First, it slows down the appellate review process considerably, re-
sulting in a waste of valuable judicial resources, by requiring the
Law Court to remand to the sentencing court in all cases where it
determines relief is necessary. Second, it leaves the Law Court with
a blunter procedural device with which to reduce sentencing dispar-
ity. Since the Law Court can no longer substitute a sentence directly
on appeal, it also cannot fix a uniform scale for a given offense, a
task which, as mentioned earlier, is critical to reducing inter-judge
sentencing disparity.
To illustrate, consider the example of a hypothetical Clark case
(Clark II) being decided after the enactment of the emergency bill.
In Clark 11, the defendant, convicted of gross sexual assault for his
rape of a sixteen-year-old woman, appeals his thirty-year sentence
to the Law Court. The Law Court, in an attempt to place the de-
fendant's conduct on a fixed scale of seriousness, determines that
the defendant's conduct does not rank at or near the top of that
scale (e.g., no weapon or extreme violence resulting in severe physi-
cal injury). But now it must remand to the trial court for resentenc-
ing. Once remanded, the scale of seriousness for the offense is no
longer fixed by the Law Court but instead by the individual sentenc-
ing judge. The placement of the defendant's conduct on that scale of
seriousness no doubt will vary from judge to judge, depending on
individual biases against the offense and offender. With nothing
more than the guidance that the defendant's conduct does not be-
long at the top of the scale, the trial judge may be left guessing how
much less than thirty years the Law Court considered an appropri-
ate sentence. Thus, it is conceivable that on remand one trial judge
could resentence the defendant to twenty-five years, while another
could choose a ten-year sentence."'
In addition, the following scenario is possible now that the Law
Court must remand all sentence appeals to the sentencing court if it
determines that relief is necessary: the Law Court remands an exces-
sive thirty-year sentence to the trial court for resentencing; on re-
mand, the trial court imposes a sentence of twenty-nine years. The
defendant again appeals the sentence to the Law Court, which again
remands the excessive twenty-nine-year sentence to the trial court
for another resentencing-and so on. Although in reality this scena-
rio is unlikely considering the mutual respect between the Law
Court and lower courts, it illustrates the potential for a more costly
210. This example illustrates that from a sentencing consistency point of view,
requiring the Law Court to remand sentence appeals to the trial court will likely
result in less consistent sentences arrived at over a longer period of time than under
the 1989 Appellate Review Act.
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and slower appellate review mechanism.
Since removing the Law Court's authority to reduce sentences was
in theory only a procedural and not a substantive change, 1 there is
nothing in the statute today which prevents the Law Court from
requiring the trial court on remand to impose a sentence within a
given range or even a specific sentence. In practice, though, the Law
Court has been reluctant to take such bold steps to date. Specifi-
cally, the court has declined to recommend an appropriate sentence
or range of sentence in the three remanded cases in which it could
have made such a recommendation since the emergency reform. 21 2
In State v. Gosselin21 3 the defendant, who shot an unarmed man
allegedly in self-defense at a local boat landing, was convicted of
manslaughter and sentenced to forty years imprisonment.2"' In im-
posing the forty-year sentence, the trial court considered the fact
that the Legislature had recently increased the maximum Class A
sentence from twenty to forty years. 1 5 The Law Court vacated the
sentence and remanded for resentencing, determining that the se-
verity of the sentence imposed was inconsistent with the facts in
that case. Specifically, the court stated that "[t]he trial judge's find-
ings of fact acquitting defendant of murder are difficult to reconcile
with the imposition of the sentence of 40 years, coming as that sen-
tence does at the very top of the sentencing range for manslaughter
and well above the 25-year minimum for murder. ' 21 6 Although the
211. The Law Court agreed with the State in State v. Gosselin that P.L. 1991, ch.
525 made only procedural changes in the 1989 Appellate Review Act. "[T]he amend-
ment to section 2155 added no new sentencing factors to those we were already bound
to consider and ... the substitution of section 2156(1-A) effected a change in proce-
dure only .... [T]he 1991 amendments make no substantive change in the law ap-
plicable to sentence appeals ...." State v. Gosselin, 600 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Me. 1991).
212. State v. Gosselin, 600 A.2d 1108 (Me. 1991); State v. Gonzales, 604 A.2d 904
(Me. 1992); State v. Reynoso, 604 A.2d 441 (Me. 1992). Although it is still too early to
tell, the Law Court's reluctance to suggest appropriate sentences to the trial court on
remand may be indicative of a more deferential approach to sentence appeals
adopted since the reaction to Lewis. Of the most recent sentence appeals to be de-
cided since the emergency legislation, a majority of the sentences appealed have been
upheld. The cases in which the sentences were upheld include: State v. Hutchinson,
597 A.2d 1344 (Me. 1991) (decided Oct. 17, 1991); State v. Weir, 600 A.2d 1105 (Me.
1991) (decided Dec. 26, 1991); State v. Kehling, 601 A.2d 620 (Me. 1991) (decided
Dec. 27, 1991); State v. Smith, 600 A.2d 1103 (Me. 1991) (decided Dec. 27, 1991); and
State v. Lemieux, 600 A.2d 1099 (Me. 1991) (decided Dec. 27, 1991). Technically, in
State v. Lemieux, the Law Court vacated the sentence and remanded only because
the term of probation exceeded the statutory limit, not because it found error in the
sentence imposed. State v. Lemieux, 600 A.2d at 1100. In the other four cases men-
tioned, the Law Court affirmed the sentences.
213. 600 A.2d 1108 (Me. 1991).
214. Id. at 1109. The underlying facts of this-case which led to Clarence Gosselin's
conviction are set out more fully in State v. Gosselin, 594 A.2d 1102 (Me. 1991).
215. State v. Gosselin, 600 A.2d at 1110.
216. Id. The Law Court was presumably referring to the lack of symmetry in the
sentence structure which resulted from the increase of the maximum Class A sen-
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Law Court also urged the trial court to consider the Lewis interpre-
tation of the Class A sentence amendment previously adopted by
the Law Court, it did not go so far as to suggest that a twenty-year
range was appropriate." '
Similarly, in State v. Reynoso1 8 the Law Court remanded a
twenty-year sentence imposed for aggravated drug trafficking ' in
order for the trial court to reconsider the sentence under the two-
tiered system established in Lewis. Once again, although the court
noted that at the time of sentencing "the trial court did not have
the guidance of our opinions in State v. Lewis . . . and State v.
Clark. . ., construing the recent increase in the maximum sentence
for a Class A offense, ' 2 0 it did not recommend an appropriate
sentence.
The Law Court perhaps came closest to recommending an appro-
priate range of sentence in State v. Gonzales."' In that case, the
defendant was convicted of aggravated trafficking in scheduled
drugs, an offense which was elevated from Class B to Class A be-
cause the defendant was within 1,000 feet of a school at the time of
the offense.222 The defendant had no prior criminal record and had
sold a relatively small quantity of drugs;22 3 nevertheless, he was sen-
tenced to fifteen years.
In defending the fifteen-year sentence, the prosecution on appeal
stated that the defendant, a Dominican national, deserved a more
serious sentence than the four-year statutory minimum because "the
Dominicans dominate the drug trade in Lewiston." 2'" The Law
Court rejected this rationale, stating that "[s]entencing on the basis
of racial categories or nationality, as opposed to demonstrated indi-
vidual involvement and culpability, is constitutionally impermissi-
ble. ' ' 225 In doing so, the court gave great weight to the fact that the
defendant would have faced a maximum sentence of two years had
he been prosecuted in federal court.22'8 Although the court did not
explicitly recommend that the defendant be re-sentenced to two
years, the fact that it considered the comparable federal sentence to
tence from 20 to 40 years.
217. Id.
218. 604 A.2d 441 (Me. 1992).
219. In this case, aggravated trafficking was a Class A offense. See MF_ Rav STAT
ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1103(2)(A) (West Supp. 1991-1992); 1105(1)(C) (West Supp. 1991-
1992); 1105(2) (West 1983).
220. State v. Reynoso, 604 A.2d at 442-43.
221. 604 A.2d 904 (Me. 1992).
222. Id. at 906.







be a relevant factor is notable.227
Nevertheless, as a result of the emergency legislation, the Law
Court no longer has the means to reduce sentencing disparity di-
rectly by determining the proper sentence on appeal. And as Gos-
selin, Reynoso, and Gonzales illustrate, neither may the court be
willing to do so indirectly by recommending an appropriate sentence
or range.22
2. Development of Sentencing Guidelines
By contrast, the court's ability to pronounce sentencing guidelines
remains intact after the emergency reform of the Appellate Review
Act. In fact, the legislation forced a clarification of the Law Court's
previously inconsistent sentencing principles. In at least two cases
following the Legislature's reform of the Act, the Law Court clarified
its previously inconsistent approaches to determining sentences.
The first post-reform case was State v. Weir.22 In the fall of 1989,
the defendant, while a juvenile, began a series of criminal activities
which culminated in an armed robbery with a firearm. After his ar-
rest, while free on bail, he committed another armed robbery. The
defendant, who had no prior criminal record but was receiving psy-
chotherapy treatment at the time the offenses were committed, en-
tered guilty pleas for both offenses. He received a twenty-year sen-
tence with all but nine years suspended and eight years probation.2 30
In Weir the Law Court clarified that it was following the Lewis
approach to sentencing.2 3' The court stated:
When imposing a sentence "the court must first determine a basic
sentence by considering the particular nature and seriousness of
the offense, without regard to the circumstances of the offender."
State v. Lewis, 590 A.2d 149, 150 (Me. 1991). Only after this first
step should the court apply its discretion to determine the degree
of mitigation called for by the circumstances of the offender and
the degree of aggravation indicated by specific factors demonstrat-
ing a high risk of re-offending. A sentencing court has wide discre-
tion in selecting sources of mitigating circumstances and aggravat-
ing factors .... 232
Thus, the court acknowledged that aggravating factors could in-
crease a basic sentence just as mitigating circumstances could reduce
227. The court stated, "It is appropriate ... that sentencing decisions in Maine
courts be informed by the likely sentence that would have been imposed for the same
offense if prosecuted in the concurrent federal jurisdiction." Id.
228. The Law Court may well want to avoid the appearance of seeking to achieve
by indirection what the Legislature explicitly took away from it.
229. 600 A.2d 1105 (Me. 1991).
230. Id. at 1106.
231. Not surprisingly, Weir was written by Justice Roberts, who also authored the
Lewis decision.
232. State v. Weir, 600 A.2d at 1106 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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a basic sentence, thereby removing the Hallowell inconsistency. In
affirming the sentence, the Law Court was satisfied that the trial
court had considered both aggravating factors (committing the sec-
ond offense while free on bail) and mitigating factors (youth, pros-
pects for rehabilitation) in the process of selecting an unsuspended
portion of the sentence. 3
3
Just one day after Weir, the Law Court again endorsed the Lewis
approach to sentencing in State v. Kehling.2 34 The facts of that case
are summarized as follows: One night Norman Kehling got into a
fight at a bar and threatened to kill the bar owner; he was arrested
for drunken and disorderly conduct. After he was released on bail,
he returned to the apartment he shared with his wife and
threatened to "burn [her] out." '235 He set fire to their multi-tenant
apartment building at about 3:00 a.m. in November, "taking with
him his prized football betting cards but leaving his fellow tenants
to their fate." '236 Although all the tenants got out safely, their be-
longings were lost in the fire. Kehling was subsequently convicted of
arson (a Class A offense) and sentenced to the new maximum forty-
year sentence. He appealed his sentence, contending that it was ex-
cessive and failed to give proper consideration to rehabilitation.
In affirming the sentence, the Law Court clearly stated how all
sentencing factors should be considered in determining an ultimate
sentence: "Trial courts in imposing sentence should, in order to
make possible effective appellate review, first determine the appro-
priate basic sentence by considering the particular nature and seri-
ousness of the offense, and then apply whatever mitigation and en-
hancement of the basic sentence all other pertinent sentencing
factors justify. 2 3
Unlike previous cases, the court in Kehling then referred to the
protection of the public interest," 8 and, for the first time, specifi-
cally clarified that this sentencing factor was an aggravating circum-
233. Id. Justice Wathen offered a lone dissent in State v. Weir. In his dissent, he
noted that the sentencing court had accepted the State's recommendation of sentence
without knowing that it was premised in part on the fact that the defendant was the
last among four co-defendants to strike a plea bargain with the prosecutor. Id. at
1107 (Wathen, J., dissenting). He would have vacated the sentence and remanded for
resentencing because of the manner in which the sentence was imposed. Id. at 1108.
See MF_ REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2155(2) (West Supp. 1991-1992).
234. 601 A.2d 620 (Me. 1991). Chief Justice McKusick wrote for the court in
Kehling.
235. Id. at 622.
236. Id. at 624.
237. Id. at 625 (emphasis added).
.238. The court noted that the category of "protection of the public interest" in-
cluded the prevention of further crime through "the restraint of convicted persons
when required in the interest of public safety," a statutorily stated goal of sentencing




stance that could increase a basic sentence. The court stated, "[fln
reviewing the propriety of a sentence, one factor we consider is 'the
protection of the public interest.' . . .The necessity of protecting
the public through incapacitation is a significant aggravating factor
that could enhance Kehling's basic sentence and offset any mitigat-
ing factors. 2
39
Kehling is also notable for the Law Court's continued adherence
to the Lewis interpretation of the Class A sentence amendment. The
court reiterated that, by increasing the maximum Class A sentence
to forty years, the Legislature had created "two discrete ranges of
sentences [whereby only] the most heinous and violent crimes com-
mitted against a person [could be sentenced] within the expanded
range of twenty to forty years."240 However, in this case (unlike the
Lewis cases) the Law Court affirmed the defendant's maximum
forty-year sentence, concluding that Kehling's conduct of setting a
fully occupied apartment house afire in the middle of the night was
"sufficiently heinous and violent to justify the imposition of a basic
sentence at the top of the upper range recognized by Lewis."24 The
result in Kehling illustrates the ineffectiveness of the emergency leg-
islation to deal with what may be a fundamental misinterpretation
of the Class A sentence amendment. Yet, without legislative clarifi-
cation on this issue, the Law Court has shown that it will continue
to apply this interpretation in future cases.
Nevertheless, the above cases show that even after the emergency
bill reforming the Appellate Review Act, the Law Court still can,
and indeed has, pronounced clear, consistent sentencing principles
to guide the sentencing court. By taking away the Law Court's
power to reduce a sentence on appeal, the emergency legislation may
impede the future ability of the court to reduce the number of dis-
parate sentences directly. On the other hand, the legislation may ac-
tually have encouraged the court to clarify the most fundamental
sentencing principles essential to an effective appellate review
mechanism.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: THE FATE OF APPELLATE
REVIEW OF SENTENCES IN MAINE
After a contentious and unstable beginning, Maine's appellate re-
view system appears to have stabilized, at least temporarily. Twice
239. Id. (emphasis added).
240. Id. at 624 (quoting State v. Lewis, 590 A.2d at 151).
241. Id. It is interesting that the Law Court could so easily distinguish between
the seriousness of the defendant's behavior in Kehling as compared to that in Clark.
Apparently, the court concluded that setting fire to an occupied apartment building
(Kehling) was "sufficiently heinous and violent" to justify a sentence in the twenty-
to forty-year range, but dragging a young woman into the woods by the throat, forc-
ing her on the ground, and raping her (Clark) was not.
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reformed in as many years, the current appellate review statute re-
stores a comfortable degree of discretion in the sentencing court, at
the expense of reducing sentencing disparity as effectively. With the
removal of the Law Court's power to reduce sentences directly, the
main argument against appellate review-that the appellate court
has not personally observed the defendant (or victim) and thus is
not equipped to make an intelligent decision on sentencing-no
longer exists. 2"
Notwithstanding the results in Lewis, Michaud, and Clark, the
Law Court has shown a great deal of deference to the trial court in
many areas. For example, although the Law Court has required the
sentencing court to consider all relevant sentencing factors and to
ensure that the sentence imposed is based on sufficient and ade-
quate information, it has deliberately refrained from telling the sen-
tencing court what weight to give such factors in any given case.243
This practice comports with the notion that the sentencing court
has observed the defendant at trial and is better able to evaluate
such factors as remorse, prospects for rehabilitation, and victim
impact.
Although Maine's sentence appeal mechanism has survived legis-
lative attack so far, the question remains whether the Appellate Re-
view Act in its current form can effectively reduce disparity in
sentences. According to one source,2" ' Maine's appellate review stat-
ute is ineffective at reducing sentencing disparity systemically for
the following reasons. First, although a sentence can no longer be
increased on appeal, only the more severe sentences tend to be ap-
pealed; thus, there is little opportunity to correct disparity in the
more lenient sentences imposed."" Second, the kinds of cases most
often appealed are not representative of the cases typically han-
242. As suggested earlier in this Comment, the rationale that the sentencing court
should have all the sentencing power because it has the opportunity to observe the
defendant at trial is flawed because of the frequency of plea bargains. See supra note
186 and accompanying text.
243. The Law Court, for instance, has upheld the sentencing court's evaluation of
a defendant's prospects for rehabilitation in sentence appeals. See. e.g., State v.
Kehling, 601 A.2d at 625. The court has stated: "A sentencing court has wide discre-
tion in selecting sources of mitigating circumstances and aggravating factors, pro-
vided they are factually reliable. In addition, we accord the sentencing court great
deference in weighing these factors in order that it may appropriately individualize
each sentence." State v. Weir, 600 A.2d at 1106 (citation omitted).
244. Donald F. Anspach and S. Henry Monsen, The Failure of the New Sentence
Review Process to Reduce Sentence Disparity in Maine: Policy Failure or Judicial
Politics? (Nov. 21, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). For other
works citing the ineffectiveness of appellate review of criminal sentences in reducing
sentencing disparity, see generally Connecticut Case Study. supra note 26; Pamela
Samuelson, Sentence Review and Sentence Disparity: A Case Study of the Connect-
icut Sentence Review Division, 10 CONN L REV 5 (1977).
245. Anspach & Monsen, supra note 244.
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died.24' For example, studies show that the most frequent offense
types handled by Maine's courts are burglary and theft; by contrast,
the types of offenses most often appealed are drug trafficking, rape,
and gross sexual misconduct.247 Finally, the number of sentence ap-
peal cases in which review is granted under the new procedure re-
mains quite small. As of September, 1991, the Sentence Review
Panel had considered 178 applications in its almost three years in
existence, granting review in only twenty-four of those cases.2 18 Of
those, eleven cases had been decided, with only five sentence reduc-
tions. 249 With such a small number of cases being considered on ap-
peal, it is impossible to have a widespread, cumulative effect on the
sentencing disparities that pervade the system.
If reducing the number of disparate sentences across the board
continues to be a primary goal of appellate review, then two sugges-
tions can be made. First, the Law Court could grant review in a
greater number of sentence appeals in order to increase the volume
of cases considered in any given year. Under the current statute, the
court would be well within its discretion to do this,25 and the pre-
sent average of fewer than ten cases per year 251 hardly represents an
unmanageable caseload.
Second, the number of disparate sentences could be further lim-
ited by creating an administrative body252 charged with the task of
compiling and disseminating sentencing statistics statewide. Cur-
rently, judges receive no comprehensive information about senten-
cing patterns and statistics in the state and thus have no measure
with which to compare the sentences before them. To date, Chief
Justice Wathen has taken the first step of gathering sentencing sta-
tistics, but the data collected so far are not statewide in scope.25 3
These efforts to accumulate sentencing statistics should be en-
couraged. If statewide data were made widely available, statistical
information would no doubt assume greater importance in sentence
246. Id.
247. Id. See also Daniel E. Wathen, Sentencing and Statistics, 6 ME, BAR J. 290
(1991) [hereinafter Sentencing and Statistics].
248. Anspach & Monsen, supra note 244.
249. Id.
250. The Sentence Review Panel, composed of three justices of the Supreme Judi-
cial Court, decides whether to grant leave to appeal sentence for any case. If any one
of the three justices decides that the case should be reviewed, leave to appeal is
granted. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2152 (West Supp. 1991-1992).
251. See text accompanying note 236.
252. One potential recipient of this task would be the former Maine Sentencing
Guidelines Commission, which submitted a report on the Maine Sentencing Guide-
lines to the Legislature in 1984. Final Report of the Maine Sentencing Guidelines
Commission established by the 111th Legislature (Nov. 30, 1984); see also P. & S.L.
1983, ch. 53, § 1.
253. Sentencing and Statistics, supra note 247. Other efforts have also been made
to gather sentencing statistics. See, e.g., Anspach & Monsen, supra note 244.
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appeals, and, if used carefully, could help reduce the sentencing dis-
parities that exist in the system today.
However, to conclude from the above that Maine's appellate re-
view statute is wholly ineffective because it fails to reduce senten-
cing disparity in a statistical sense would be to miss the larger pur-
pose of the appellate review procedure. This purpose is to develop
fair and just sentencing principles at common law with which to bet-
ter structure and guide the discretion of the sentencing court. If the
Law Court can create and articulate uniform and rational sentencing
principles, then it can encourage trial judges to impose reasonable
sentences and to affirmatively state the reasons for their sentencing
decisions. There is no reason why sentencing judges should not be
required to articulate in detail the basis for a sentence imposed.
Mandatory sentences prescribed by the Legislature fail to take into
consideration human factors uniquely within the sentencing judge's
knowledge. Appellate review attempts to strike a balance between
rule and discretion.
Maine's appellate review statute thus provides the Law Court
with the opportunity to create a body of sentencing law. And as the
cases discussed in this Comment have shown, the Law Court has
reached a level of preliminary success in achieving that goal. In eval-
uating the success of Maine's appellate review procedure, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that "[e]quality of sentences is not the
goal-such uniformity would be as unjust as disparity. Rather the
goal is an equality of consideration; a consistent application of sen-
tencing principles.2 25
4
The history of appellate review of criminal sentences in Maine has
been brief but tumultuous. Appellate sentence review has suffered
from the errors and misjudgments of many parties, foremost the
Law Court and the Legislature. First, as to the Law Court, an incon-
sistent and unclear line of early cases on sentencing principles cre-
ated confusion within the legal community. For example, comparing
the sentencing approaches in Hallowell and Lewis reveals an uncer-
tainty as to whether circumstances of the offender, such as a prior
criminal record, could increase or only decrease a basic sentence.
Similarly, whether the court considered victim impact a valid sen-
tencing factor (and, if so, whether victim impact could increase a
basic sentence) was not entirely obvious from the pre-reform cases.
However, as the most recent line of cases shows, the court appears
to have rectified this problem, at least for now.
Second, the court adopted an interpretation of the Legislature's
recent increase of the maximum Class A sentence from twenty to
forty years which was not supported by the statutory language of
the amendment. This interpretation, although understandably an
254. State v. Morton, No. AD-82-8, slip op. at 4 (Me. App. Div. June 3. 1983).
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attempt to limit the distortion in the proportionality of the Maine
Criminal Code, amplified the court's sentence reductions in the
Lewis cases to alarming proportions. Finally, by writing needlessly
inflammatory, untactful opinions in Michaud and Clark, the Law
Court seemed to invite criticism and media attention. For example,
justifying a fifteen-year sentence reduction on the ground that rape
could be committed in "more aggravating and heinous ways" than
by dragging a girl into the woods by the throat, forcing her on the
ground, and threatening her25 5 was neither a persuasive nor compel-
ling argument to the public.
However, the Legislature's response to the Law Court was not
without its own problems. In 1988 the Legislature gave the Law
Court a broad mandate to reduce disparity in criminal sentences
through appellate review. Yet only eight decisions and less than two
years later, that same body took away one of the court's salutary
powers to accomplish that goal. Although removing the Law Court's
power to reduce sentences certainly restored some discretion in the
trial court, it also created early instability and uncertainty in the
system by altering the appellate review procedure.
In its haste to reprimand the Law Court, the Legislature, in its
emergency reform, also failed to address the court's interpretation of
the Class A sentence amendment. Today, the Legislature is left in
the position of having either to introduce yet another bill reforming
the appellate review statute or to accept the Law Court's interpreta-
tion. Perhaps more importantly, though, the Legislature should not
have increased the maximum sentence for all Class A crimes from
twenty to forty years. Not only did this amendment lead to various
interpretations concerning which crimes should be affected by the
new forty-year maximum (thus the resulting problems under the
Appellate Review Act), it also disturbed the structure of the sen-
tencing system set forth in the Maine Criminal Code.
The following recommendation should remedy this problem. The
Legislature should repeal or reform the 1988 amendment that in-
creased the maximum sentence for all Class A offenses from twenty
to forty years. Several alternatives are possible. First, since one of
the objectives of the Class A sentence amendment was to allow trial
courts greater discretion when punishing the most heinous crimes
committed against the person, those crimes only-attempted mur-
der, manslaughter, gross sexual assault, etc.-should be targeted
specifically and classified into a new category of offense with a maxi-
mum sentence of forty years.2 56 The creation of a Class AA category
would neither distort the proportionality of the Criminal Code nor
undermine the intent of the Legislature to target the most serious
255. See State v. Clark, 590 A.2d 538, 542 (Me. 1991).
256. See Appendix of this Comment for proposed legislation adding a Class AA
offense category to the Maine Criminal Code.
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crimes committed against the person. In addition, further conflict
between the intent of the Class A sentence amendment and the op-
eration of the appellate sentence review procedure could be avoided.
Second, in order to reduce the impact of the good-time laws on
sentences, the Legislature should do either of the following: change
the automatic one-third deduction to a smaller fraction of the sen-
tence; or make the deduction for good time discretionary rather
than automatic.
In addition, this Comment makes the following recommendations
in order to preserve and perhaps improve the functioning of the ap-
pellate sentence review procedure. First, the Law Court, as it has
done in its recent decisions, should continue to issue opinions con-
sistent with the sentencing approach set forth in Lewis and clarified
in Weir. This sentencing approach is fair and equitable because it
parallels current community sentiment that some factors, such as a
defendant's prior criminal record and the impact of the offense on
the victim, ought to be able to increase a basic sentence determined
by the nature and seriousness of the offense. Second, the court
should grant review in a greater number of sentence appeals, since
the process of developing sentencing guidelines depends on a rela-
tively high volume of cases considered in any given year. If current
numbers are any indication, increasing the quantity of sentence ap-
peals granted would not exceed the court's capacity for review.
Third, the Legislature should refrain from tinkering with the appel-
late review statute in the near future. Indeed, changing the appellate
sentence review procedure every time the Law Court renders a
"bad" decision may create worse problems than the one solved; thus,
legislative intervention should be a last resort. Rather, prosecutors
and defense counsel alike should direct problems to the Law Court
through strong advocacy for change, in order to give the court the
first opportunity to clarify its position or correct its mistakes. A
statement made by a commentator regarding Connecticut courts is
equally applicable to Maine's Law Court: "[G]reater scrutiny and
criticism by the bar of such sentencing principles as are proposed
would contribute substantially to the improvement of future opin-
ions and, ultimately, to the improvement of the sentencing process
itself." '257
In the final analysis, a return to the basic, philosophical questions
of sentencing posed by the hypothetical case of the child molester at
the beginning of this Comment is helpful: What are the appropriate
sentencing factors to consider? What relative importance should
these factors have in any given case? These fundamental questions
must be resolved if any sentencing guideline system is to succeed.
Obviously, Maine's appellate sentence review mechanism cannot by
257. Connecticut Case Study, supra note 26, at 1476.
1992]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
itself resolve these intractable sentencing questions, but by balan-
cing trial court discretion with appellate court review, the current
system does attempt to determine who should decide these ques-
tions and why. The conflict between the Law Court and the Legisla-
ture over where that balance should lie has caused early instability
in the sentence review procedure and uncertainty for its future. Ul-
timately, whether appellate review of criminal sentences can succeed
in Maine depends on whether the court and the Legislature can
maintain a delicate balance between their respective interests and
ends. From the cases decided since the emergency legislation, they
appear to have struck that balance, at least for the time being. But a
reasonable question remains whether the early conflicts described in
this Comment portend future tensions for the appellate review pro-
cedure in Maine.
Amy K. Tchao
VI. APPENDIX: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE MAINE CRIMINAL
CODE2
5 s
The proposed legislation offered below has two main objectives:
(a) to create a new category of crimes-a Class AA crime-which
carries a maximum sentence of forty years; and (b) to restore the
maximum sentence for a Class A crime to twenty years. In keeping
with the legislative intent behind the Class A sentence amendment
enacted in 1988, this proposal targets the most serious crimes com-
mitted against a person for Class AA status. Specifically, those of-
fenses (currently Class A crimes) which involve intentional infliction
of serious bodily injury or extreme indifference, to the value of
human life are redefined as Class AA crimes. This proposal ad-
dresses the problem of disproportionality in the structure of the
Maine Criminal Code which currently exists as a result of the 1988
enactment changing the maximum sentence for all Class A crimes to
forty years.
Part I of the proposed legislation lists pertinent sections of the
Maine Criminal Code which, under this proposal, would require the
inclusion of a Class AA crime in the statutory language. Part II con-
tains all the offenses which are currently Class A crimes. It leaves
the language of some Class A offenses unchanged; thus, these of-
fenses carry a twenty-year maximum sentence. However, some of
these offenses are elevated to Class AA crimes, which would carry a
maximum sentence of forty years.
258. The proposed legislation below was drafted with the assistance of Michael
Saucier, Esq., of the law firm of Thompson & Bowie, Portland, Me., and Professor
Melvyn Zarr, University of Maine School of Law.
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PART I. GENERAL PROVISIONS 29
TITLE 17-A
CHAPTER 1: PRELIMINARY
§ 4. Classification of crimes in this Code
1. Except for murder, all crimes defined by the Code are classified
for purposes of sentencing as Class AA, Class A, Class B, Class C,
Class D and Class E crimes.
§ 4-A. Crimes and civil violations outside the Code
2-A. A statute outside this code may be expressly designated as a
Class AA, Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D or Class E crime, in
which case sentencing for violation of such a statute is governed by
the provisions of this code.
3. In statutes defining crimes which are outside this code and
which are not expressly designated as Class AA, Class A, Class B,
Class C, Class D or Class E crimes, the class depends upon the im-
prisonment penalty that is provided as follows. If the maximum pe-
riod authorized by the statute defining the crime:
A. Exceeds 10 years, the n1m saCls A
A.(1) Exceeds 20 years, the crime is a Class AA crime;
A.(2) Exceeds 10 years, but does not exceed 20 years, the crime is
a Class A crime;
B. Exceeds 5 years, but does not exceed 10 years, the crime is a
Class B crime;
C. Exceeds 3 years, but does not exceed 5 years, the crime is a
Class C crime;
D. Exceeds one year, but does not exceed 3 years, the crime is a
Class D crime; and
E. Does not exceed one year, the crime is a Class E crime.
CHAPTER 51: SENTENCES OF IMPRISONMENT
§ 1252. Imprisonment for crimes other than murder
2. The court shall set the term of imprisonment as follows:
A. In the case of a Class A crime, the court shall set aefi-
nierod not to exceed 40 yeas
A.(1) In the case of a Class AA crime, the court shall set a defi-
nite period not to exceed 40 years;
A.(2) In the case of a Class A crime, the court shall set a definite
period not to exceed 20 years;
B. In the case of a Class B crime, the court shall set a definite
period not to exceed 10 years;
C. In the case of a Class C crime, the court shall set a definite
period not to exceed 5 years;
259. Proposed deletions are struck out; proposed additions are underlined.
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D. In the case of a Class D crime, the court shall set a definite
period of less than one year; or
E. In the Case of a Class E crime, the court shall set a definite
period not to exceed 6 months.
Comment
This amendment to subsection 2, paragraph A creates a new class
of crimes-Class AA-with a maximum sentence of 40 years and
restores the maximum Class A sentence to 20 years.
3. (unchanged)
3-A. (unchanged)
4. If the State pleads and proves that a Class A, B, C, D or E crime
was committed with the use of a dangerous weapon then the sen-
tencing class for such crime is one class higher than it would other-
wise be. In the case of a Class A AA crime committed with the use
of a dangerous weapon, such use should be given serious considera-
tion by the court in exercising its sentencing discretion. This subsec-
tion shall not apply to a violation or an attempted violation of sec-
tion 208 or to any offense for which the sentencing class is otherwise
increased because the actor or an accomplice to his knowledge is
armed with a firearm or other dangerous weapon.
5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, if the State
pleads and proves that a Class AA, A, B, or C crime was committed
with the use of a firearm against a person, the minimum sentence of
imprisonment, which shall not be suspended, shall be as follows:
When the sentencing class for such crime is Class AA, the minimum
term of imprisonment shall be 6 years; when the sentencing class for
such crime is Class A, the minimum term of imprisonment shall be 4
years; when the sentencing class for such crime is Class B, the mini-
mum term of imprisonment shall be 2 years; and when the sentenc-
ing class for such crime is Class C, the minimum term of imprison-
ment shall be one year. For purposes of this subsection, the
applicable sentencing class shall be determined in accordance with
subsection 4.
Comment
This amendment to subsection 5 creates a mandatory minimum
sentence of 6 years when a Class AA crime is committed with the
use of a firearm against a person.
5-A. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Code, for a person
convicted of violating section 1105:
A. Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs B and C, the mini-
mum sentence of imprisonment, which shall not be suspended, shall
be as follows: When the sentencing class is Class AA, the minimum
term of imprisonment shall be 6 years; when the sentencing class for
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such crime is Class A, the minimum term of imprisonment shall be 4
years; when the sentencing class is Class B, the minimum term of
imprisonment shall be 2 years; and, with the exception of trafficking
or furnishing marijuana under section 1105, when the sentencing
class is Class C, the minimum term of imprisonment shall be one
year.
Comment
This amendment to subsection 5-A creates a mandatory minimum
sentence of 6 years when a person convicted of violating section
1105 (aggravated trafficking or furnishing scheduled drugs) com-
mits a Class AA crime.
B. (unchanged)
C. If the court imposes a sentence under paragraph B, the minimum
sentence of imprisonment, which shall not be suspended, shall be as
follows: When the sentencing class is Class AA, the minimum term
of imprisonment shall be one year; when the sentencing class is
Class A, the minimum term of imprisonment shall be 9 months;
when the sentencing class is Class B, the minimum term of impris-
onment shall be 6 months; and with the exception of trafficking or
furnishing marijuana under section 1105, when the sentenc-
ing class is Class C, the minimum term of imprisonment shall be 3
months.
Comment
This amendment to paragraph C creates a mandatory minimum
sentence of one year when a person convicted of violating section
1105 (aggravated trafficking or furnishing scheduled drugs) com-
mits a Class AA crime and the court imposes a sentence under para-
graph B.
CHAPTER 53: FINES
§ 1301. Amounts authorized
1-A. A natural person who has been convicted of a Class AA,
Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D or Class E crime may be sen-
tenced to pay a fine. . . . Subject to these sentences and to section
1302, the fine may not exceed:
A. $50,000 for a Class AA crime or a Class A crime;
B. $20,000 for a Class B crime;
C. $5,000 for a Class C crime;
D. $1,000 for a Class D crime;
E. $1,000 for a Class E crime; and
F. Regardless of the classification of the crime, any higher amount
that does not exceed twice the pecuniary gain derived from the




3. If the defendant convicted of a crime is an organization and the
law that the organization is convicted of violating expressly provides
that the fine it authorizes may not be suspended, the organization
must be sentenced to pay the fine authorized in that law. Otherwise,
the maximum allowable fine that such a defendant may be sen-
tenced to pay is:
A. Any amount for murder;
B. $100,000 for a Class AA crime or a Class A crime;
C. $40,000 for a Class B crime;
D. $20,000 for a Class C crime;
E. $10,000 for a Class D crime or a Class E crime; and
F. Any higher amount that does not exceed twice the pecuniary
gain derived from the crime by the convicted organization.
Comment
Subsections 1-A and 3 are amended to provide that the maximum
fine for a Class AA crime is the same as the maximum fine for a
Class A crime.
PART II. SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSES
(Current Class A Crimes)
TITLE 17
CHAPTER 93-B: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF MINORS
§ 2922. Sexual exploitation of a minor
1. (unchanged)
2. (unchanged) Penalty. Sexual exploitation of a minor is a Class
B crime, except that any person convicted of this crime shall be sen-
tenced by imprisonment for not less than 5 years. If the State pleads
and proves a prior conviction under this section, then the crime is a
Class A crime, except that any person convicted of this 2nd crime
shall be sentenced by imprisonment for not less than 10 years. ...
TITLE 17-A
CHAPTER 7: OFFENSES OF GENERAL
APPLICABILITY
§ 151. Conspiracy
§ 151(9). . . . except that conspiracy to commit murder is a Class
A AA crime.
§ 152. Attempt
§ 152(4). . . . attempt to commit murder is a Class A AA crime.
§ 153. Solicitation
§ 153(4). (unchanged) . . . except that solicitation to commit mur-




This amendment changes the offenses of conspiracy to commit
murder, attempt to commit murder, and solicitation to commit
murder from Class A to Class AA crimes, giving each offense a
maximum sentence of 40 years.
CHAPTER 9: OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON
§ 202. Felony murder
§ 202(3). Felony murder is a Class A AA crime.
§ 203. Manslaughter
§ 203(3). Manslaughter is a Class A AA crime except that ....
Comment
This amendment changes the offenses of felony murder and man-
slaughter from Class A to Class AA crimes, giving each offense a
maximum sentence of 40 years.
CHAPTER 11: SEXUAL ASSAULTS
§ 251. Definitions and general provisions
§ 251(1)(E). (unchanged) "Compulsion" means the use of physical
force, a threat to use physical force or a combination thereof that
makes a person unable to physically repel the actor or produces in
that person a reasonable fear that death, serious bodily injury or
kidnapping might be imminently inflicted upon that person or an-
other human being.
"Compulsion" as defined in this paragraph places no duty upon
the victim to resist the actor.
§ 253. Gross sexual assault
1. (unchanged) A person is guilty of gross sexual assault if that
person engages in a sexual act with another person and:
A. The other person submits as a result of compulsion, as defined
in section 251, subsection 1, paragraph E; or
B. The other person, not the actor's spouse, has not in fact at-
tained the age of 14 years.
1-A. A person is guilty of gross sexual assault if that person en-
gages in a sexual act with another person and:
A. The actor causes serious bodily injury to the other person; or
B. The actor causes bodily injury to the other person with use of a
dangerous weapon; or
C. The actor causes bodily injury to the other person under cir-
cumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life. Such circumstances include, but are not limited to, the number,
location or nature of the injuries, the manner or method inflicted, or





4[two options]. (Option 1) Violation of subsection 1 is a Class A
crime.
OR
4. (Option 2) Violation of subsection 1, paragraph A is a Class A
crime. Violation of subsection 1, paragraph B is a Class AA crime.
4-A. Violation of subsection 1-A is a Class AA crime.
5. (unchanged) Violation of subsection 2, paragraph A, B, C, D, E
or H is a Class B crime. Violation of subsection 2, paragraph F, G or
I is a Class C crime.
Comment
The proposed changes to section 253 are designed to differentiate
between gross sexual assault which causes serious bodily injury or
is committed with extreme indifference to the value of human life
on the one hand, and gross sexual assault which involves physical
force or threat of physical force but which does not result in serious
bodily injury, on the other. The language in proposed subsection 1-
A is derived from section 208 (aggravated assault). The amendment
treats the former offense more seriously as a Class AA crime with a
maximum sentence of 40 years, while the latter offense is a Class A
crime with a 20-year maximum sentence. Currently, the Code
makes no statutory distinction between these two ways to commit
the offense and the maximum sentence for both is 40 years.
Subsection 4 presents two options for designating the maximum
sentence when a section 253 offense is committed against a victim
less than 14 years old. The first option leaves the subsection 4 lan-
guage unchanged; thus, if the victim is less than 14 years old and
the offense does not involve serious bodily injury or extreme indif-
ference to the value of human life, the maximum sentence under
Option 1 is 20 years. The second option is designed to give the
sentencing court greater discretion when dealing with gross sexual
assault committed against a person less than 14 years old. Option 2
thus makes such an offense a Class AA crime with a 40-year maxi-
mum sentence. An adoption of Option 2 would evidence the Legis-
lature's intention to overrule the Law Court's opinion in State v.
Michaud, 590 A.2d 538 (Me. 1991).
CHAPTER 13: KIDNAPPING AND CRIMINAL
RESTRAINT
§ 301. Kidnapping
1. A person is guilty of kidnapping if either:
A. He knowingly restrains another person with the intent to
(1) hold him for ransom or reward;
(2) use him as a shield or hostage;
(3) inflict bodily injury upon him or subject him to conduct de-
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fined as criminal in chapter 11;
(4) terrorize him or a 3rd person;
(5) facilitate the commission of another crime by any person or
flight thereafter; or
(6) interfere with the performance of any government or political
function; or
B. He knowingly restrains another person:
(1) circumstances which, in fact, expose such other person to risk
of serious bodily injury; or
(2) by secreting and holding him in a place where he is not likely
to be found:;
(3) and the actor causes serious bodily injury to the other person;
(4) and the actor causes bodily injury to the other person with
use of a dangerous weapon; or
(5) and the actor causes bodily injury to the other person under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life. Such circumstances include, but are not limited to, the
number, location or nature of the injuries, the manner or method




3. Kidnapping as defined in subsection 1, paragraph A is a Class
A crime. It is, however, a defense which reduces the crime to a Class
B crime, if the defendant voluntarily releases the victim alive and
not suffering from serious bodily injury, in a safe place prior to trial.
4. Violation of subsection 1, paragraph B, subparagraph (1), (3),
(4), or (5) is a Class AA crime. Violation of subsection 1, paragraph
B, subparagraph (2) is a Class AA crime.
Comment
The proposed changes in section 301 are designed to differentiate
between kidnapping under circumstances which cause serious bod-
ily injury or risk of serious bodily injury on the one hand, and kid-
napping without such circumstances, on the other. The proposed
language in subsection 1, paragraph B, subparagraphs (3), (4), and
(5) is derived from section 208 (aggravated assault). The amend-
ment treats the former kidnapping offense more seriously as a
Class AA crime with a maximum sentence of 40 years, while the
other kidnapping offenses are Class A crimes carrying a 20-year
maximum sentence.
CHAPTER 17: BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS
§ 401. Burglary
§ 401(2). (unchanged) Burglary is classified as:
A. A Class A crime if the defendant was armed with a firearm, or
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knew that an accomplice was so armed; and...
CHAPTER 27: ROBBERY
§ 651. Robbery
1. (unchanged) A person is guilty of robbery if he commits or at-
tempts to commit theft and at the time of his actions:
A. He recklessly inflicts bodily injury on another;
B. He threatens to use force against any person present with the
intent
(1) to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking of the prop-
erty, or to the retention of the property immediately after the tak-
ing; or
(2) to compel the person in control of the property to give it up or
to engage in other conduct which aids in the taking or carrying away
of the property;
C. He uses physical force on another with the intent enumerated
in paragraph B, subparagraphs (1) or (2);
D. He intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury on
another; or
E. He or an accomplice to his knowledge is armed with a danger-
ous weapon in the course of a robbery as defined in paragraphs A
through D.
2. Robbery as defined in subsection 1, paragraphs A and B, is a
Class B crime. Robbery as defined in subsection 1, paragraph C-,
and-E, is a Class A crime. Robbery as defined in subsection 1,
paragraphs D and E, is a Class AA crime.
Comment
The purpose of this amendment to section 651 is to make the fol-
lowing offenses Class AA crimes with a 40-year maximum sentence:
robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon; and robbery com-
mitted with intentional infliction of bodily injury. Robbery which
involves physical force on another is a Class A crime, and robbery
involving threats of use of force or reckless infliction of bodily in-
jury are Class B crimes.
CHAPTER 33: ARSON AND OTHER PROPERTY
DESTRUCTION
§ 802. Arson
1. A person is guilty of arson if he starts, causes, or maintains a
fire or explosion:
A. On the property of another with the intent to damage or de-
stroy property thereon; or
B. On his own property or the property of another with the intent
to enable any person to collect insurance proceeds for the loss
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caused by the fire or explosion, or which recklessly endangers the
property of another.
(1) t intent to ena.l . . . to collet insrae o
¥.,,Ieds for ..-.e 1t--ah- fileoI expl1osion, or
(2) whieh teekless1y enfag a~~o rth ~p~~o
another.
C. On his own property or the property of another which reck-
lessly endangers any person.
2. (unchanged)
3. Arson as defined in subsection 1, paragraphs A and B, is a
Class A crime. Arson as defined in subsection 1, paragraph C is a
Class AA crime.
Comment
This proposed change to section 802 is designed to treat arson
which endangers the life of any person more severely than arson
which endangers only property. Arson which creates a serious risk
to human life is a Class AA crime warranting a 40-year maximum
sentence; however, arson committed with intent to destroy prop-
erty which does not endanger any person is a Class A crime.
§ 803. Causing a catastrophe
1. A person is guilty of causing a catastrophe if he recklessly
causes a catastrophe by explosion, fire, flood, avalanche, collapse of
a structure, release of poison, radioactive material, bacteria, virus or
other such force or substance that is dangerous to human life and
difficult to confine.
2. As used in this section, "catastrophe" means death or serious
bodily injury to 10 or more people or substantial damage to 5 or
more structures, as defined in section 2, subsection 24.
3. Causing a catastrophe is a Class A AA crime.
Comment
Since the definition of "catastrophe" includes death or serious bod-
ily injury to 10 or more people, the proposal changes the crime of
causing a catastrophe from a Class A to a Class AA offense.
CHAPTER 45: DRUGS
§ 1105. Aggravated trafficking or furnishing scheduled
drugs
1. (unchanged)
2. (unchanged) Aggravated trafficking or furnishing is a crime one
class more serious than such trafficking or furnishing would other-
wise be.
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Comment
Under section 1105, if the drug trafficking offense is considered a
Class B crime, i.e., section 1103(2)(A), the aggravated offense is a
Class A crime with a 20-year maximum sentence. To the extent
that the sentencing of drug offenses in Maine courts should take
into consideration the federal sentence for the same offense, see
State v. Gonzales, 604 A.2d 904 (Me. 1992), a 20-year maximum
sentence for aggravated drug trafficking of the substances listed in
section 1103(2)(A) is more consistent with the comparable range of
sentences under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines than a 40-year
maximum sentence.
